

TRENDS IN JUVENILE VIOLENCE

**A Report to the United States Attorney General
on Current and Future Rates of Juvenile Offending**

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Executive Summary

Trends in Juvenile Violence arises out of an August 1995 briefing to United States Attorney General Janet Reno on behalf of the Office of Justice Programs. The primary theme of the briefing was the extent to which rates of juvenile homicide and other violent offenses by youth are rising and can be expected to increase further in the years ahead.

Recent reports of a declining rate of violent crime in cities across the country would seem to be at odds with the growing problem of youth violence. The overall drop in crime hides the grim truth. There are actually two crime trends in America--one for the young, one for the mature--which are moving in opposite directions.

From 1990 to 1994, for example, the overall rate of murder in America changed very slightly, declining a total of four percent. For this same time period, the rate of killing at the hands of adults, ages 25 and over declined 18 percent and that for young adults, ages 18-24 rose barely two percent; however, the rate of murder committed by teenagers, ages 14-17 jumped a tragic 22 percent.

The recent surge in youth crime actually occurred while the population of teenagers was on the decline. But this demographic benefit is about to change. As a consequence of the "baby boomerang" (the offspring of the baby boomers), there are now 39 million children in this country who are under the age of ten, more young children than we've had for decades. Millions of them live in poverty. Most do not have full-time parental supervision at home guiding their development and supervising their behavior. Of course, these children will not remain young and impressionable for long; they will reach their high-risk years before too long. As a result, we likely face a future wave of youth violence that will be even worse than that of the past ten years.

The key statistical findings of the report are highlighted below:

- From 1985 to 1994, the rate of murder committed by teens, ages 14-17, increased 172 percent. The rate of killing rose sharply for both black and white male teenagers, but not for females.
- Remaining just above one percent of the population, black males ages 14-24 now constitute 17 percent of the victims of homicide and over 30 percent of the perpetrators. Their white counterparts remained about 10 percent of the victims, about 18 percent of the perpetrators, yet declined in proportionate size of the population.
- Guns, and especially handguns, have played a major role in the surge of juvenile murder. Since 1984, the number of juveniles killing with a gun has quadrupled, while the number killing with all other weapons combined has remained virtually constant.
- The largest increase in juvenile homicide involves offenders who are friends and acquaintances of their victims.
- The differential trends by age of offender observed for homicide generalize to other violent offenses. From 1989 to 1994, the arrest rate for violent crimes (murder, rape, robbery and aggravated assault) rose over 46 percent among teenagers, but only about 12 percent among adults. In terms of arrest rates per 100,000 population, 14-17 year-olds have now surpassed young adults, ages 18-24.
- By the year 2005, the number of teens, ages 14-17, will increase by 20%, with a larger increase among blacks in this age group (26%).
- Even if the per-capita rate of teen homicide remains the same, the number of 14-17 year-olds who will commit murder should increase to nearly 5,000 annually because of changing demographics. However, if offending rates continue to rise because of worsening conditions for our nation's youth, the number of teen killings could increase even more.

The challenge for the future, therefore, is how best to deal with youth violence. Without a large-scale effort to educate and support young children and preteens today, we can likely expect a much greater problem of teen violence tomorrow. There is, however, still time to stem the tide, and to avert the coming wave of teen violence. But time is of the essence.

Trends in Juvenile Violence

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Since the early 1800s, criminologists have labored to measure crime levels, patterns and trends in a reliable and accurate fashion. In the United States, efforts to calibrate a reliable measure of national crime levels date back to 1930, when the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program was first launched. While the UCR protocols have undergone substantial change over the years and the geographic coverage of data collection has approached virtual completeness, the so-called dark figure of crime (i.e., those crimes not reported to the police) has long been a major concern for those relying on the UCR crime index.

In response, the National Crime Survey (NCS) was initiated in 1973 by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, and later overhauled by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), in order to avoid the limitations inherent in official police statistics on crime incidence. While the NCS certainly reduces the dark figure of crime, critics have also raised issues surrounding random and non-random errors in the victim survey results.

The dual availability of alternative crime measures--police data on crimes/arrests and victim survey estimates--has been a two-edged sword. Although the strengths of the two major data series are complementary, discrepancies in their trends over time have often created confusion concerning which data program was more dependable for researchers and policy-makers alike.

The good news is that as the UCR and NCS initiatives have continued to be refined, their measurements are beginning to converge. Figure 1 shows four alternative indicators of the incidence of violent crime in the United States: estimated offense totals based on the NCS, estimated NCS offense counts adjusted for victim reporting rates, offenses reported to the police from the UCR, and UCR total arrests for violent offenses. For the sake of comparison, homicide counts were added to the NCS data, and simple assaults were removed.

A consistent pattern emerges since the late 1970s. In all four data series, but to varying degrees, the incidence of violence appears to have peaked or at least plateaued around 1980, and then to have subsided or at least leveled off until the mid-1980s. Since the mid-1980s, however, the incidence of violence has risen, according to all four indicators. Also noteworthy is the close agreement since 1989 in the reported NCS and UCR totals.

Much of this swing pattern was anticipated by criminologists as early as two decades ago (e.g., see J.A. Fox, *Forecasting Crime Data*,

Lexington: Lexington Books, 1978). Figure 2, for example, displays a forecast of the rate of violent crime for urban areas, generated in 1976, based on an econometric model of crime rates, clearance rates, police force size, and police expenditures, plus various demographic and socio-economic characteristics. To a large extent, the rise and fall of violent crime was predicted based on the changing size of the crime-prone age group.

The premise in *Forecasting Crime Data* was fairly simple. The explosion in crime during the 1960s and 1970s, was seen largely as the result of demographic shifts. The post-World War II baby boomers had then reached their late adolescence and early twenties, an age at which aggressive tendencies are the strongest. As the baby boom cohort matured into adulthood during the 1980s, taking on families, jobs and other responsibilities, it was expected that the violent crime rate would subside. More to the point, the projected decline in the size of the population most prone to violence would likely translate into a reduced level of crime, violence and disorder.

As it happened, a downturn in violent crime did occur, but it was short-lived. By 1986, most unexpectedly, crime trends turned for the worse. The welcomed drop in violent crime of the early 1980s evaporated prematurely after just five years. The rate of crime began to surge, despite continued shrinkage within the most crime-prone population.

This pattern can be seen most clearly in levels of homicide. In fact, most of this report will focus on this most serious form of violence. Not only do the Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR) offer detailed, incident-based information on trends and patterns, but these data do not suffer the same kinds of reporting and definitional problems associated with other measures of violent crime.

Figure 3 plainly reveals a sudden break, beginning in the mid-1980s, in the historically close connection between the homicide rate and the percentage of young adults within the population. In essence, the composition of the crime-prone age group was changing.

It is somewhat misleading even to attempt to track an overall rate of violent crime, without accounting for age differences. As shown in Figure 4 (and Table 1), there are actually two crime trends ongoing in America--one for the young and one for the mature, which are moving in opposite directions. Since 1985, the rate of homicide committed by adults, ages 25 and older, has declined 25%, from 6.3 to 4.7 per 100,000, as the baby boomers matured into their middle-age years. At the same time, however,

the homicide rate among 18-24 year-olds has increased 61%, from 15.7 to 25.3 per 100,000. Even more alarming and tragic, homicide is now reaching down to a much younger age group--children as young as 14-17. Over the past decade, the rate of homicide committed by teenagers, ages 14-17, has more than doubled, increasing 172%, from 7.0 per 100,000 in 1985 to 19.1 in 1994. Thus, although the percentage of 18-24 year-olds has declined in recent years, younger teens have become more involved in serious violent crime, including homicide, thereby expanding the age limits of the violence-prone group to as young as 14.

Rates of homicide (both offending and victimization) have increased among white and black youth, and among males but not females. The rate of killing by white male teenagers has doubled since 1985, that by black male teens has more than tripled (see Figs. 5a,b, Table 2).

The increasing role of male teenagers and young adults in the homicide problem is quite pronounced. Males, ages 14-24 are less than eight percent of the population yet commit 48 percent of the murders. They are also 27 percent of the victims of homicide. Isolating these trends by race (see Table 3 and Figs. 6a,b), young white males, ages 14-24, have diminished in relative size to less than seven percent, but have remained 10 percent of the homicide victims and 17 percent of the perpetrators. More striking, however, is that over the past decade, black males, ages 14-24 have remained just above one percent of the population yet have expanded from 9 to 17 percent of the victims and from 17 to 30 percent of the offenders.

Trends in arrest rates by age, displayed in Figure 7a, support the results thus far based on SHR records of known offenders. For homicide, arrest rates have dropped among adults, ages 25 and over, and have increased for persons under age 25. The sharpest increase has been among teens. A similar pattern, although with a small increase among adults, has occurred for all violent crimes (homicide, rape, robbery and aggravated assault) combined. As shown in Figure 7b, teens now exceed young adults in absolute rate of arrest for violent crime overall. Conventional wisdom in criminology--that young adults generally represent the most violence-prone group--apparently needs to be modified in light of these changes. Of course, the arrest data are more difficult to interpret, because they tend to confound offense patterns with criminal justice practices. The agreement between violent arrest rates and SHR homicide data, however, lends greater credence to these findings.

Regardless of measurement, it is clear that too many teenagers in this country, particularly

those in urban areas, are plagued with idleness and even hopelessness. A growing number of teens and preteens see few feasible or attractive alternatives to violence, drug use and gang membership. For them, the American Dream is a nightmare: There may be little to live for and to strive for, but plenty to die for and even to kill for.

The causes of the surge in youth violence since the mid-1980s reach, of course, well-beyond demographics. There have been tremendous changes in the social context of crime over the past decade, which explain why this generation of youth is more violent than others before it. This generation of youth has more dangerous drugs in their bodies, more deadly weapons in their hands and a seemingly more casual attitude about violence.

The problem of kids with guns cannot be overstated in view of recent trends in gun-related killings among youngsters. As shown in Figure 8, since the mid-1980s, the number of gun-homicides, particularly with handguns, perpetrated by juveniles has quadrupled, while the prevalence of juvenile homicide involving all other weapons combined has remained virtually constant.

Guns are far more lethal in several respects. A 14-year-old armed with a gun is far more menacing than a 44-year-old with a gun. Although juveniles may be untrained in using firearms, they are more willing to pull the trigger without fully considering the consequences. Also, the gun psychologically distances the offender from the victim; if the same youngster had to kill his or her victim (almost always someone known) with hands, he or she might be deterred by the physical contact.

As shown in Figure 9, the most significant growth in terms of victim-offender patterns in juvenile homicide is found among friends and acquaintances (see also Table 4). With the spread of guns among a youthful population, combined with the cumulative, desensitizing effects of media-glamorized violence, it has become too easy for juveniles to engage in deadly disputes over small, even trivial, matters--such as a pair of sneakers, a leather jacket, a challenging glance, or no reason at all.

While the negative socializing forces of drugs, guns, gangs and the media have become more threatening, the positive socializing forces of family, school, religion and neighborhood have grown relatively weak and ineffective. Increasingly, children are being raised in homes disrupted by divorce or economic stress; too many children emerge undersocialized and undersupervised. Too many of them do not have the benefit of a strong, positive role model in their lives.

At this juncture, as many as 57% of children in America do not have full-time parental

supervision, either living with a single parent who works full-time or in a two-parent household with both parents working full-time (see Fig. 10). The lack of parental supervision for young children is nearly as great. As many as 49% of children under age six do not have the benefit of full-time parenting. While some children enjoy suitable, substitute supervision provided by friends and relatives or in day-care, far too many do not.

The problem, of course, does not end nor the solution necessarily begin with the breakdown of the traditional family. Because of deep funding cuts in support programs for youth--from after-school care to recreation, from mentoring to education--as a society, we are missing the fleeting window of opportunity to compensate for the diminished role of the family. As a consequence, children spend too little time engaged in structured activity with positive role models, and too much time "hanging out" or watching a few savage killings on television.

The problem of unsupervised youth is clearly reflected in the time-of-day patterns of juvenile violence. As shown in Figure 11, the prime-time for juvenile crime is during the after-school hours, and certainly not after midnight when curfew laws might be contemplated. For these South Carolina data, specifically, 40 percent of the juvenile violent offenses occurred after 3 PM and before 8 PM.

As if the situation with youth violence was not bad enough already, future demographics are expected to make matters even worse. Not only are today's violent teens maturing into more violent young adults, but they are being succeeded by a new and larger group of teenagers. The same massive babyboom cohort that as teenagers produced a crime wave in the 1970s has since grown up and has had children of their own. There are now nearly 40 million children in this country under the age of ten (see Fig. 12), a larger count than has existed for several decades. This "baby boomerang" cohort of youngsters will soon reach their adolescence.

By the year 2005, the number of teens, ages 14-17 will have increased 20% over its 1994 level, likely producing additional increases in crime and other social problems associated with an expanding youth population. As shown in Figure 13, the number of teenage offenders has grown in recent years, even as the population of teenagers has contracted. But now the teen population is on the upswing.

The population growth will be different for whites and blacks. The projected growth in the number of white male teens, shown in Figure 14a, will be modest, peaking in fifteen years at a level far below that of the mid-1970s. For blacks, on the other hand, the number of 14-17 year-old males will have increased 26% by 2005, and will

continue to expand well into the next century, easily surpassing the population levels of twenty years ago (see Fig. 14b).

If current age-race-sex specific rates of offending remain unchanged, the number of teens who commit murder shall increase, if only because of the demographic turnaround in the population at-risk. As shown in Figure 15, the estimated number of teen killers (known 14-17 year-old offenders plus an estimated share of unidentified offenders) could increase from nearly 4,000 per year in 1994 to almost 5,000 per year by 2005, as a result of demographic growth alone.

But all else may not be equal. Given the worsening conditions in which children are being raised, given the breakdown of all of our institutions as well as of our cultural norms, given our wholesale disinvestment in youth, we will likely have many more than 5,000 teen killers per year. Even if the recent surge in teenage homicide rates slows, our nation faces a future juvenile violence problem that may make today's epidemic pale in comparison.

The optimistic view, of course, is that there is still time to stem the tide--to prevent the next wave of youth crime. But we must act now--by reinvesting in schools, recreation, job training, support for families, and mentoring. We must act now while this baby-boomerang generation is still young and impressionable, and will be impressed with what a teacher, a preacher, or some other authority figure has to say. If we wait until these children reach their teenage years and the next crime wave is upon us, it may be too late to do much about it. It is far easier and considerably less expensive to build the child than to rebuild the teen.

The challenge for the future, therefore, is how best to deal with youth violence. Without a large-scale effort to educate and support young children and preteens today, we can likely expect a much greater problem of teen violence tomorrow. Expanding law enforcement and correctional resources will clearly help alleviate an overburdened criminal justice system, but, as always, an ounce of prevention in schools or community centers may be worth ten years of cure inside the walls of a prison cell.

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AUTHOR'S NOTE

Most of the tabulations contained in this report utilized a cumulative, 1976-1994 data file of the FBI's *Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR)*, with incident records updated in December 1995. In order to ensure comparability with published homicide rates, the SHR records were weighted in such a way as to match the SHR victim count to the estimated homicide count contained in the printed *Crime in the United States*. On average, the cases were weighted upward by 8.75 percent.

Except for Figure 15, offender data represent incidents in which characteristics of the offender were known. For Figure 15, demographic characteristics of unknown offenders were estimated or imputed from known victim and incident information

A number of abbreviations and shortened terms are used throughout this report. FBI refers to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and BJS to the Bureau of Justice Statistics. Homicide includes murder and non-negligent manslaughter, and excludes justifiable homicides. The term "juvenile" refers to persons under the age of 18, while "teen" and "teenager" are employed for youngsters between the ages of 14 and 17 inclusive. Also, "young adult" refers to the age group 18-24.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

James Alan Fox is Dean and Professor of the College of Criminal Justice at Northeastern University in Boston. He holds a B.A. in Sociology, an M.A. in Criminology, an M.A. in Statistics, and a Ph.D. in Sociology, all from the University of Pennsylvania. He has published twelve books, including *Mass Murder: America's Growing Menace*, *How to Work with the Media*, and *Overkill: Mass Murder and Serial Killing Exposed*, and *Killer on Campus* (forthcoming). He has also published dozens of journal and magazine articles and newspaper columns, primarily in the areas of multiple murder, juvenile crime, workplace violence, and capital punishment. As an authority on homicide, he appears regularly on television and radio programs around the country, including *48 Hours*, *20/20*, *The Today Show*, all network newscasts, and is frequently interviewed by the national press. He was also profiled in a two-part cover story in *USA Today*. Finally, Fox often gives lectures and expert testimony, including several appearances before the United States Congress.

Table 1: Trends in Homicide Offending Rates by Age, Race and Sex
(Rates per 100,000 Population)

Year	Under 14	14-17	18-24	25+	Male	Female	White	Black
1976	.2	8.1	17.7	7.9	13.2	2.5	4.0	35.3
1977	.2	7.2	16.8	7.6	12.7	2.3	4.0	32.5
1978	.2	7.4	17.7	7.7	13.3	2.2	4.2	32.9
1979	.2	8.3	19.3	7.9	14.2	2.2	4.4	34.4
1980	.2	8.5	20.0	7.9	14.5	2.2	4.5	33.9
1981	.1	8.5	18.8	8.1	14.3	2.2	4.5	33.9
1982	.2	7.6	17.3	7.2	12.9	2.0	4.2	30.0
1983	.1	6.9	16.0	6.6	11.9	1.9	4.0	26.8
1984	.1	6.2	15.3	6.3	11.3	1.7	3.9	24.0
1985	.2	7.0	15.7	6.3	11.5	1.7	3.8	25.1
1986	.2	8.4	17.4	6.7	12.4	1.7	4.0	27.7
1987	.2	8.6	17.2	6.1	11.7	1.6	3.8	26.1
1988	.2	10.8	18.9	6.0	12.4	1.6	3.7	28.8
1989	.2	12.4	21.2	5.8	12.8	1.6	3.8	29.7
1990	.1	16.2	24.8	6.0	14.4	1.6	4.2	32.9
1991	.2	17.6	28.2	5.8	14.6	1.6	4.0	34.8
1992	.2	17.4	26.0	5.2	13.4	1.4	3.7	31.4
1993	.2	19.3	26.6	5.0	14.1	1.4	3.8	34.0
1994	.2	19.1	25.3	4.7	13.6	1.3	3.7	32.1

Source: FBI, Supplementary Homicide Reports, and Census Bureau, Current Population Survey. Includes known offenders only.

Table 2: Trends in Homicide Offending Rates by Age, Sex and Race Combinations
(Rates per 100,000 Population)

Year	14-17				18-24				25+			
	Male		Female		Male		Female		Male		Female	
	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
1976	7.9	51.2	1.0	7.8	16.7	138.3	2.0	23.7	7.2	76.5	1.2	17.1
1977	7.6	44.8	.9	4.4	16.5	124.3	2.0	22.4	7.2	70.1	1.2	16.1
1978	7.7	44.4	.9	6.0	18.0	131.2	2.0	20.5	7.5	71.5	1.1	14.9
1979	9.2	47.1	.9	6.0	19.5	144.2	2.1	20.3	7.8	73.5	1.2	13.8
1980	8.9	48.9	.7	5.1	20.4	144.6	2.0	21.5	7.9	71.4	1.1	13.2
1981	8.4	55.0	1.0	6.3	19.8	135.5	1.9	17.8	8.2	72.4	1.1	13.5
1982	8.1	45.7	.9	4.4	17.5	120.8	2.0	18.6	7.6	62.3	1.1	11.6
1983	7.5	36.8	1.1	5.3	17.3	104.9	1.8	16.6	7.0	56.2	1.1	10.4
1984	6.9	33.4	.9	4.7	18.0	91.1	2.0	13.8	7.0	51.0	.9	9.2
1985	7.0	44.3	.7	4.9	17.2	101.3	1.8	13.3	7.0	50.2	.9	9.3
1986	9.0	51.0	.8	4.2	18.5	117.2	1.7	15.5	7.1	55.9	.9	9.8
1987	8.0	54.1	1.1	5.1	17.6	121.2	2.0	12.9	6.7	48.7	.9	8.4
1988	9.9	72.6	.8	5.2	16.9	146.9	2.0	15.2	6.4	50.5	.8	7.9
1989	11.5	84.6	.8	5.3	19.1	168.5	2.0	14.0	6.2	47.4	.8	8.3
1990	14.3	113.8	1.1	5.2	22.2	200.7	2.1	14.7	6.6	48.9	.8	7.7
1991	14.6	127.5	.9	7.7	23.2	241.2	1.9	15.7	6.3	46.4	.8	7.5
1992	14.4	122.5	1.0	7.5	21.7	219.0	1.7	12.8	5.5	42.6	.7	6.4
1993	14.4	151.6	1.0	6.7	20.9	215.8	1.6	14.3	5.5	39.7	.8	5.9
1994	15.6	139.6	1.1	6.7	20.9	201.0	1.6	13.1	5.3	35.5	.7	5.8

Source: FBI, Supplementary Homicide Reports, and Census Bureau, Current Population Survey. Includes known offenders only.

Table 3: Percentage of Population, Homicide Victims, and Homicide Offenders by Age, Sex and Race

	14-17				18-24				25+			
	Male		Female		Male		Female		Male		Female	
	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
1976-78												
Population	3.4%	.5%	3.2%	.5%	5.4%	.7%	5.6%	.9%	23.9%	2.4%	26.6%	3.1%
Victims	1.6%	1.3%	.8%	.4%	8.0%	7.9%	2.8%	2.4%	27.7%	25.9%	9.5%	6.0%
Offenders	3.6%	3.5%	.4%	.5%	12.9%	13.3%	1.6%	2.6%	24.2%	24.6%	4.3%	6.8%
1979-82												
Population	3.0%	.5%	2.9%	.5%	5.4%	.8%	5.5%	.9%	24.5%	2.6%	27.3%	3.3%
Victims	1.5%	1.3%	.7%	.4%	9.0%	7.9%	3.0%	2.0%	28.8%	25.1%	9.5%	5.6%
Offenders	3.4%	3.3%	.3%	.4%	13.9%	13.7%	1.5%	2.3%	25.7%	23.8%	4.1%	5.6%
1983-86												
Population	2.6%	.5%	2.5%	.5%	5.0%	.8%	5.1%	.9%	25.3%	2.8%	27.9%	3.5%
Victims	1.2%	1.3%	.7%	.4%	8.1%	7.8%	2.8%	2.0%	28.8%	23.7%	10.9%	5.8%
Offenders	3.2%	3.1%	.4%	.4%	14.0%	12.3%	1.5%	2.0%	28.0%	23.4%	4.1%	5.3%
1987-90												
Population	2.4%	.4%	2.2%	.4%	4.4%	.7%	4.4%	.8%	26.0%	3.0%	28.4%	3.7%
Victims	1.4%	2.5%	.6%	.4%	7.4%	10.9%	2.3%	1.9%	25.5%	24.5%	10.0%	6.3%
Offenders	3.8%	5.5%	.3%	.3%	12.5%	16.7%	1.4%	1.7%	25.5%	21.9%	3.6%	4.5%
1991-94												
Population	2.2%	.4%	2.1%	.4%	4.1%	.7%	4.0%	.7%	26.2%	3.1%	28.4%	3.8%
Victims	2.1%	3.3%	.5%	.5%	8.0%	13.9%	1.9%	1.8%	23.3%	23.1%	8.7%	6.0%
Offenders	4.7%	8.3%	.3%	.4%	12.7%	21.9%	1.0%	1.5%	21.4%	18.4%	3.0%	3.5%

Source: FBI, Supplementary Homicide Reports, and Census Bureau, Current Population Survey. Includes known offenders only.

Table 4: Trends in Homicide Offending Patterns by Offender Age

	14-17				18-24				25+			
	76-81	82-87	88-94	Total	76-81	82-87	88-94	Total	76-81	82-87	88-94	Total
Offender Sex												
Male	89.9%	90.1%	94.5%	92.3%	87.4%	88.4%	92.4%	89.7%	82.6%	84.4%	85.7%	84.2%
Female	10.1%	9.9%	5.5%	7.7%	12.6%	11.6%	7.6%	10.3%	17.4%	15.6%	14.3%	15.8%
Offender Race												
White	49.4%	48.7%	37.0%	42.9%	47.6%	49.4%	37.9%	44.0%	47.4%	51.8%	51.3%	50.3%
Black	48.8%	49.1%	60.8%	55.0%	50.5%	48.5%	60.2%	54.0%	50.3%	46.3%	46.6%	47.8%
Other	1.8%	2.3%	2.2%	2.1%	1.9%	2.1%	1.8%	1.9%	1.7%	1.9%	2.1%	1.9%
Weapon												
Handgun	37.7%	39.1%	62.2%	50.5%	42.0%	41.0%	58.0%	48.4%	50.4%	46.4%	46.8%	47.9%
Other gun	20.2%	18.9%	15.7%	17.6%	17.4%	14.2%	13.7%	14.9%	18.5%	16.9%	14.5%	16.7%
Other	42.1%	42.0%	22.1%	31.9%	40.7%	44.9%	28.3%	36.7%	31.1%	36.7%	38.7%	35.5%
Relationship												
Family	16.7%	15.1%	8.0%	11.9%	16.0%	14.7%	9.7%	13.0%	29.1%	27.2%	25.2%	27.2%
Known	48.2%	52.7%	55.0%	52.7%	55.9%	58.3%	59.4%	58.1%	55.8%	58.1%	59.6%	57.8%
Stranger	35.1%	32.1%	37.0%	35.4%	28.0%	27.0%	30.9%	28.9%	15.1%	14.7%	15.2%	15.0%
Circumstances												
Felony	39.1%	35.5%	33.6%	35.5%	30.9%	30.7%	32.0%	31.3%	14.1%	15.9%	19.4%	16.5%
Argument	38.9%	39.3%	34.4%	36.7%	48.8%	50.3%	43.4%	47.0%	66.6%	66.1%	61.3%	64.7%
Other	22.0%	25.3%	32.0%	27.8%	20.3%	19.1%	24.6%	21.7%	19.3%	17.9%	19.2%	18.8%

Source: FBI, Supplementary Homicide Reports, and Census Bureau, Current Population Survey. Includes known offenders only.