U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs Bureau of Justice Statistics Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin Capital Punishment 1993 NCJ-150042 This report is one in a series. More recent editions may available. To view a list of all in the series go to http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pubalp2.htm#cp Full text with tables available from: Bureau of Justice Statistics Clearinghouse 800-732-3277 Box 179 Annapolis Junction, MD. 20701-0179 FAX Number (for report orders and mail list signup only): 410-792-4358 Capital Punishment 1993 By James Stephan BJS Statistician and Peter Brien BJS Statistical Assistant Ten States executed 38 prisoners during 1993. The number of persons executed was seven more than in 1992 and was the largest annual number since the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of revised State capital punishment laws in 1976. The prisoners executed during 1993 had been under sentence of death an average of 9 years and 5 months, about 1 month less than the average for inmates executed the previous year. For the 2,716 prisoners under sentence of death at yearend, 55% were held by States in the South. Western States had an additional 22%; Midwestern States, 16%; and the Northeastern States of Connecticut, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, 7%. California held the largest number of death row inmates (363), followed by Texas (357), Florida (324), and Pennsylvania (169). Six prisoners were in Federal custody under a death sentence on December 31, 1993. Between January 1 and December 31, 1993, 30 State prison systems and the Federal prison system received 282 prisoners under sentence of death. California (33 admissions), Florida (32), North Carolina (32), and Texas (27) accounted for 44% of the inmates entering prison under a death sentence in 1993. Ten States executed 38 persons in 1993--17 in Texas; 5 in Virginia; 4 in Missouri; 3 in Florida; 2 each in Arizona, Delaware, and Georgia; and 1 each in California, Louisiana, and Washington. All were men. Status of the death penalty, December 31, 1993 Executions Number of prisoners Jurisdictions during 1993 under sentence of death without a death penalty ____________________________________________________________ ____ Texas 17 California 363 Alaska Virginia 5 Texas 357 District of Columbia Missouri 4 Florida 324 Hawaii Florida 3 Pennsylvania 169 Iowa Arizona 2 Illinois 152 Kansas Delaware 2 Ohio 129 Maine Georgia 2 Oklahoma 122 Massachusetts California 1 Alabama 120 Michigan Louisiana 1 Arizona 112 Minnesota Washington 1 North Carolina 99 New York Tennessee 98 North Dakota Georgia 96 Rhode Island 23 other Vermont jurisdictions 575 West Virginia Wisconsin Total 38 Total 2,716 *At yearend 1993, 34 States and the Federal prison system held 2,716 prisoners under sentence of death, 5.3% more than at yearend 1992. All had committed murder. *During 1993, 38 men were executed: 18 were non-Hispanic and white 13 were non-Hispanic and black 1 was Native American 4 were white and Hispanic 2 had an unknown Hispanic origin (1 white and 1 black). *The average time between sentencing and yearend 1993 for the 2,716 inmates was 6 years and 1 month. *During 1993, 282 prisoners under a sentence of death were received by State prison systems from the courts. *Among inmates under sentence of death and with available criminal histories, 2 in 3 had a prior felony conviction; nearly 1 in 10 had a prior homicide conviction. *About 2 in 5 inmates sentenced to death had a criminal justice status when they committed their capital offense: About half of these were on parole and half included persons with charges pending, on probation, in prison or escaped from prison, and others. *Almost 1 in 7 persons sentenced to death between 1988 and 1993 had received two or more death sentences. *Of persons under sentence of death-- 1,566 (57.7%) were white 1,109 (40.8%) were black 22 (0.8%) were Native American 16 (0.6%) were Asian American 3 were classified as "other race." *The 206 Hispanic inmates under sentence of death accounted for 8.1% of inmates with a known ethnicity. *Thirty-five (1.3%) of the persons under a death sentence were women. *Half of the inmates sentenced to death had been sentenced at age 29 or older. Eighteen of the executed prisoners were non-Hispanic whites; 13 were non-Hispanic blacks; 4, white Hispanics; 1, white with unknown Hispanic origin; 1, black with unknown Hispanic origin; and 1, Native American. Twenty-six of the executions were carried out by lethal injection, 10 by electrocution, 1 by lethal gas, and 1 by hanging. From January 1, 1977, to December 31, 1993, a total of 226 executions took place in 21 States. Of these 121 (53.5%) were white, 87 (38.5%) were black, 16 (7.1%) were Hispanic, and 2 (0.9%) were Native American. During 1977-93, a total of 4,259 persons entered State prisons under sentences of death, among whom 2,468 (57.9%) were white, 1,724 (40.5%) were black, and 67 (1.6%) were of other races. Also during 1977-93, 1,789 removals from a death sentence occurred as a result of dispositions other than execution (resentencing, retrial, commutation, or death while awaiting execution). Of those removed from under a death sentence, 937 (52.4%) were white, 747 (41.7%) were black, 17 (0.9%) were Native American, 8 (0.5%) were Asian American, and 80 (4.5%) were Hispanic. Capital punishment in the courts Dobbs v. Zant, January 19, 1993 Without dissent, the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit erred in refusing to consider a newly discovered transcript of the sentencing hearing which was unavailable during the original sentencing proceeding. The defendant sought habeas corpus relief, charging that he received ineffective assistance from his court-appointed counsel at sentencing. The High Court emphasized the importance of reviewing capital sentences on a complete record and remanded the case for further proceedings. Graham v. Collins, January 25, 1993 This case involved a petitioner who claimed that Texas' sentencing instructions to the jury prevented the jury from adequately considering certain mitigating evidence. When the Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Federal habeas corpus relief, the Supreme Court agreed to consider the appeal. Because this case came before the Supreme Court on collateral review, the Court, consistent with the principles established in Teague v. Lane (1990), had first to determine whether the relief sought by the petitioner would require the creation of a new rule of constitutional law.The Court held that petitioner's claim would require a new rule; therefore, his claim was barred. After the petitioner was convicted of capital murder, a separate punishment phase was conducted to determine the sentence. For the death sentence to be imposed according to Texas' capital-sentencing statute then in effect, a jury had to answer affirmatively each of three questions: (1) Was the conduct of the defendant committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that death would result? (2) Is there a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society? and (3) Was the conduct of the defendant unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased? After being instructed to consider all of the evidence, the jury unanimously answered yes to all three special issues. Upon appeal, the defendant claimed that the three special issues did not allow the jury to consider fully the mitigating circumstances of his youth, character, and otherwise crime-free background. The Supreme Court held that the defendant's claim would require a fourth special issue that would instruct the jury to consider any mitigating evidence, independent of its relevance to the three special issues. Because the ruling that the petitioner sought would have constituted a new rule under Teague v. Lane, the Court denied Federal habeas corpus relief. Herrera v. Collins, January 25, 1993 This case dealt with the issue of whether a capital defendant can seek Federal habeas corpus relief by claiming that new evidence renders him actually innocent of the murder for which he was sentenced to death. In 1982 the defendant was sentenced to death for the murder of a police officer. Following his conviction, he pleaded guilty to the murder of a second police officer. Ten years after his conviction, the defendant filed a second petition for Federal habeas corpus relief arguing that he was innocent of the murders of the police officers and that the defendant's now-dead brother had committed the murders. The defendant offered four new affidavits in his defense. The district court dismissed most of the claims but granted a request for a stay of execution so that another appeal could be made. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found no evidentiary basis for petitioner's claim and vacated the stay of execution. Affirming the findings of the court of appeals in a five-to-three decision, the Supreme Court held that a claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence is not ground for Federal habeas corpus relief. The Court defended as consistent with due process the Texas statute which requires that a new trial motion based on newly discovered evidence be made within 60 days of judgment. Lockhart v. Fretwell, January 25, 1993 The defense counsel failed to object during the sentencing phase on a matter in which the objection would have been sustained. If the objection had been made, a sentence of death would have been precluded. After the proceeding, a Supreme Court decision in Strickland v. Washington (1984), removed the validity of such an objection. In this case the Supreme Court decided whether the defense counsel's failure to make an objection in a State criminal proceeding deprived the defendant of a fair trial. The defendant was convicted of capital felony murder and sentenced to death by an Arkansas jury after the jury found one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances to exist. Defendant petitioned for collateral relief to the Arkansas Supreme Court on the basis that the death sentence was unconstitutional under the then-existing precedent of Collins v. Lockhart (1985). The Arkansas Supreme Court declined to consider whether to follow Collins because defense counsel had failed to raise the issue during the sentencing phase; the court affirmed both the conviction and the death sentence The defendant appealed to the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the Collins objection, and that this failure amounted to prejudice under Strickland. Under Strickland, a defendant demonstrates prejudice by showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to render an unfair or unreliable result. Unfairness or unreliability does not result unless counsel's ineffectiveness deprives the defendant of a substantive or procedural right to which the law entitles him. The district court, in a ruling affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, found prejudice, granted habeas corpus relief, and conditionally vacated the death sentence. By seven to two, the Supreme Court held that the sentencing proceeding was neither unfair nor unreliable because the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit overruled Collins in 1989. Reversing the court of appeals' decision to vacate the death sentence, the Court ruled that the defendant suffered no prejudice from counsel's deficient performance. Delo v. Lashley, March 8, 1993 In this case the Court examined the adequacy of the trial court's instruction during the punishment phase. The defendant argued that the trial court: (1) violated the defendant's eighth amendment due process rights by refusing to instruct the jury as to the mitigating circumstance of "no significant history of prior criminal activity," and (2) failed to automatically instruct the jury that the defendant was to be presumed innocent. Without dissent, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on both counts. On the first count, the High Court held that no evidence was offered by defense counsel to support the instruction of the mitigating circumstance. Applying a principle established in Lockett v. Ohio (1978), no eighth amendment violation occurred because nothing in the Constitution obligates State courts to give mitigating circumstance instructions when no evidence is offered to support them. On the second count, the Supreme Court ruled that the defendant in this case was convicted fairly in the guilt phase of the trial; therefore, the presumption of innocence disappears. The defendant was not automatically entitled to a "presumption of innocence" instruction. Arave v. Creech, March 30, 1993 The Supreme Court considered whether Idaho's aggravating circumstance, that the defendant exhibited "utter disregard for human life," was unconstitutionally vague. The petitioner in this case was an inmate serving life terms for several first-degree murders. He had admitted to killing or participating in the killing of at least 26 people. Bodies of 11 of his victims were recovered in 7 States. The defendant received the death penalty for the murder of a physically handicapped fellow inmate, whose skull the defendant smashed with a sock full of batteries and whom he repeatedly kicked about the throat and head. The petitioner was sentenced to death, in part because of the aggravating circumstance that he exhibited "utter disregard for human life." Affirming the trial court's decision, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected petitioner's argument that the aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague, holding that the validity of the aggravating circumstance stemmed from their finding that the petitioner was a "cold-blooded, pitiless" killer. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction in part because the aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague. In a seven to two decision, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and held that the aggravating circumstance provides clear and objective standards and minimizes the risk of an arbitrary and capricious application of the death penalty. Sullivan v. Louisiana, June 1, 1993 The Supreme Court reviewed a jury instruction that was essentially identical to an instruction held unconstitutional in Cage v. Louisiana (1990) to determine whether it was harmless error. In the Louisiana trial of a defendant charged with first-degree murder in the course of committing armed robbery, the judge gave instructions to the jury that included a definition of reasonable doubt that was essentially identical to a definition previously ruled to be unconstitutional. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to death. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Louisiana upheld the conviction but remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing on grounds other than the erroneous jury instruction, which it ruled harmless. In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Supreme Court of Louisiana. The Supreme Court held that in a criminal case, a jury instruction which is constitutionally deficient in the definition of reasonable doubt would always invalidate a conviction. The Court concluded that reliance on an unconstitutional definition of reasonable doubt violates the defendant's sixth amendment right to jury trial. Godinez v. Moran, June 24, 1993 The Supreme Court considered whether the competency standard for pleading guilty or waiving the right to counsel is higher than the competency standard for standing trial. The petitioner was sentenced to death by a Nevada jury for using an automatic pistol to fatally shoot a bartender and patron four times each and his former wife five times. Two psychiatrists examined the defendant and concluded that he was competent to stand trial. Approximately 10 weeks after the evaluations, the defendant decided to discharge his attorneys and change his pleas to guilty. After review of the defendant's mental condition, the trial court accepted the waiver of counsel and guilty pleas. The defendant was then sentenced to death. The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, claiming that he had been mentally incompetent to represent himself. The court of appeals reversed the conviction, ruling that the conviction was based upon a legal standard for competency that was too low. In a seven-to-two decision, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that the decision to waive the right to counsel does not require a higher level of mental functioning than the decision to waive other constitutional rights. The Court held that the standard for measuring a criminal defendant's competency to plead guilty or to waive the right to counsel is not higher than the standard for standing trial. Johnson v. Texas, June 24, 1993 In this case the High Court again examined the death penalty as applied in Texas. The Court upheld Texas' capital sentencing system as consistent with the 8th and 14th amendments. Because this case came to the Supreme Court on direct review of the petitioner's conviction and sentence, the restraints established in Teague v. Lane did not apply. The case involved a 19 year-old drug abuser who robbed and murdered a convenience store clerk. After the jury determined that the defendant was guilty of capital murder, the separate punishment phase was conducted. Upon appeal, defense counsel argued that the special issues did not specifically instruct the jury to consider the defendant's age as a mitigating factor. In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there was no reason to believe that the jury was precluded from considering the defendant's youth in its determinations. Focusing on the special issue that the defendant would continue to threaten the community, the High Court concluded that the jury was able to make a determination on a defendant's future dangerousness by asking the extent to which youth influenced the defendant's conduct. Statutory changes During 1993, 12 States revised statutory provisions relating to the death penalty. Most of the changes involved additional aggravating circumstances, additional categories of victims permitting the application of the death penalty, and broadening of the law to allow a defendant to choose between two methods of execution. By State, these statutory changes were as follows: Arizona--Added new sections to and revised an act relating to death sentences. These revisions became effective 7/21/93. In specifying conditions of a sentence to life in prison without the possibility of release, the revision eliminates a previous stipulation of release. The stipulation was that the defendant could be released after 25 years if the victim was at least age 15 and after 35 years if the victim was less than 15 (13-703). Arizona lawmakers also provided that persons sentenced to death shall not be executed if they are mentally ill or incompetent and cannot understand the nature of the punishment or the reasons for the execution (13-4021). Arkansas--Added teachers and other school employees to its capital murder victims list that includes law enforcement officers, prison officials, probation and parole officers, fire fighters and court officials (5-10-101), effective 8/13/93 California--Revised its penal code to allow persons sentenced to death to choose between lethal gas and lethal injection as the method of execution (paragraph 3604), effective 1/1/93. Colorado--Revised a statute to prohibit sentencing mentally retarded persons to death (16- 9-403), effective 4/29/93. Connecticut--Added to its penal code as an aggravating factor the defendant's use of an assault weapon in a capital felony (53a-46a), effective 10/1/93. Illinois--Added paramedics, ambulance drivers, and other medical assistance or first aid personnel killed in the course of duty to its capital murder victims list (720-ILCS 5/9 1(b)(2)), effective 1/1/93. Indiana--Added probation and parole officers, community corrections officers, and home detention officers to its capital murder victims list, and added carjacking murder as an aggravating circumstance (3-50-2-9), effective 7/1/93. Louisiana--Amended its code of criminal procedure to provide for a 12 hour delay between the verdict and the sentencing hearing in a capital case (LA C. Cr. P. Art 905). Nevada--Enacted a law expanding the number of aggravating circumstances under which the death penalty may be imposed to include conviction of more than one offense of murder in the first or second degree (AB-58), effective 10/1/93. New Jersey--Added "leader of a narcotics-trafficking network" as an aggravating circumstance (NJS.A.ZC:11- 3(:)), effective 5/5/93; and amended the State's death penalty statute to state that the term "homicidal act" means conduct that causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death (NJS.A.2C:11-3(c) and-3(c)(4)(i), effective 1/26/93. Ohio--Amended its penal code to permit persons sentenced to death to elect to be executed by means of a lethal injection instead of by electrocution (O.R.C. 2949.22), effective 10/1/93. Texas--Added to its list of capital offenses the following: murder of more than one person during the same criminal transaction, murder of more than one during different criminal transactions but according to the same scheme or course of conduct, and murder of an individual under age 6 (19.03 (a)(z)), effective 9/1/93. Alabama. Murder during kidnaping, robbery, rape, sodomy, burglary, sexual assault, or arson; murder of a peace officer, correctional officer, or public official; murder while under a life sentence; murder for pecuniary gain or contract; aircraft piracy; murder by a defendant with a previous murder conviction; murder of a witness to a crime; murder when a victim is subpoenaed in a criminal proceeding, when the murder is related to the role of the victim as a witness; murder when a victim is less than 14 years old; murder in which a victim is killed while in a dwelling by a deadly weapon fired from outside the dwelling; murder in which a victim is killed while in a motor vehicle by a deadly weapon fired from outside that vehicle; murder in which a victim is killed by a deadly weapon fired from a motor vehicle (13A-5-40). Arizona. First-degree murder accompanied by at least 1 of 10 aggravating factors. Arkansas. Capital murder as defined by Arkansas statute (5-10-101). Felony murder; arson causing death; intentional murder of a law enforcement officer, teacher or school employee; murder of prison, jail, court, or correctional personnel or of military personnel acting in line of duty; multiple murders; intentional murder of a public officeholder or candidate; intentional murder while under life sentence; contract murder. California. Treason; homicide by a prisoner serving a life term; first-degree murder with special circumstances; train wrecking; perjury causing execution. Colorado. First-degree murder; kidnaping with death of victim; felony murder. Capital sentencing excludes persons determined to be mentally retarded. Connecticut. Murder of a public safety or correctional officer; murder for pecuniary gain; murder in the course of a felony; murder by a defendant with a previous conviction for intentional murder; murder while under a life sentence; murder during a kidnaping; illegal sale of cocaine, methadone, or heroin to a person who dies from using these drugs; murder during first-degree sexual assault; multiple murders; the defendant committed the offense(s) with an assault weapon. Delaware. First-degree murder with aggravating circumstances. Federal prison system. See Appendix II. Florida. First-degree murder; capital felonies (FS 921.141); capital drug trafficking felonies (FS 921.142). Georgia. Murder; kidnaping with bodily injury when the victim dies; aircraft hijacking; treason; kidnaping for ransom when the victim dies. Idaho. First-degree murder; aggravated kidnaping. Illinois. First-degree murder accompanied by at least 1 of 12 aggravating factors. Indiana. Murder with 13 aggravating circumstances. Kentucky. Aggravated murder; kidnaping when victim is killed. Louisiana. First-degree murder; treason (La. R.S. 14:30 and 14:113). Maryland. First-degree murder, either premeditated or during the commission of a felony. Mississippi. Capital murder includes murder of a peace officer or correctional officer, murder while under a life sentence, murder by bomb or explosive, contract murder, murder committed during specific felonies (rape, burglary, kidnaping, arson, robbery, sexual battery, unnatural intercourse with a child, nonconsensual unnatural intercourse), and murder of an elected official. Capital rape is the forcible rape of a child under 14 years old by a person 18 years or older. Aircraft piracy. Missouri. First-degree murder (565.020 RSMO). Montana. Deliberate homicide; aggravated kidnaping when victim or rescuer dies; attempted deliberate homicide, aggravated assault, or aggravated kidnaping by a State prison inmate who has a prior conviction for deliberate homicide or who has been previously declared a persistent felony offender (46-18-303,MCA). Nebraska. First-degree murder. Nevada. First-degree murder with 9 aggravating circumstances. New Hampshire. Contract murder; murder of a law enforcement officer; murder of a kidnaping victim; killing another after being sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. New Jersey. Purposeful or knowing murder; contract murder. New Mexico. First-degree murder; felony murder with aggravating circumstances. North Carolina. First-degree murder (N.C.G.S. 14-17). Ohio. Assassination; contract murder; murder during escape; murder while in a correctional facility; murder after conviction for a prior purposeful killing or prior attempted murder; murder of a peace officer; murder arising from specified felonies (rape, kidnaping, arson, robbery, burglary); murder of a witness to prevent testimony in a criminal proceeding or in retaliation (O.R.C. secs. 2929.02, 2903.01, 2929.04). Oklahoma. Murder with malice aforethought; murder arising from specified felonies (forcible rape, robbery with a dangerous weapon, kidnaping, escape from lawful custody, first-degree burglary, arson); murder when the victim is a child who has been injured, tortured, or maimed. Oregon. Aggravated murder. Pennsylvania. First-degree murder. South Carolina. Murder with statutory aggravating circumstances. South Dakota. First-degree murder; kidnaping with gross permanent physical injury inflicted on the victim; felony murder. Tennessee. First-degree murder. Texas. Murder of a public safety officer, fireman, or correctional employee; murder during the commission of specified felonies (kidnaping, burglary, robbery, aggravated rape, arson); murder for remuneration; multiple murders; murder during prison escape; murder by a State prison inmate; murder of an individual under 6 years of age. Utah. Aggravated murder (76-5-202, Utah Code annotated). Virginia. Murder during the commission or attempts to commit specified felonies (abduction, armed robbery, rape, sodomy); contract murder; murder by a prisoner while in custody; murder of a law enforcement officer; multiple murders; murder of a child under 12 years during an abduction; murder arising from drug violations (18.2-31, Virginia Code as amended). Washington. Aggravated first-degree premeditated murder. Wyoming. First-degree murder, including both premeditated and felony murder. Method of execution As of December 31, 1993, lethal injection was the predominant method of execution (25 States). Twelve States authorized electrocution; 8 States, lethal gas; 3 States, hanging; and 2 States, a firing squad. Fourteen States authorized more than one method--lethal injection and an alternative method--generally at the election of the condemned prisoner; however, 3 of these 14 stipulated which method must be used, depending on the date of sentencing; 1 authorized hanging only if lethal injection could not be given; and 1 authorized lethal gas if lethal injection is ever ruled unconstitutional. Federal executions, effective February 18, 1993, are to be carried out by lethal injection. Automatic review Of the 36 States with capital punishment statutes at yearend 1993, 35 provided for review of all death sentences regardless of the defendant's wishes. Arkansas had no specific provisions for automatic review, and the issue was in litigation in South Carolina. The Federal death penalty procedures did not provide for automatic review after a sentence of death had been imposed. While most of the 35 States authorized an automatic review of both the conviction and sentence, Idaho, Indiana, Montana, and Tennessee required review of the sentence only. In Idaho, review of the conviction had to be appealed or forfeited. In Indiana, a defendant could waive review of the conviction. The review was usually conducted by the State's highest appellate court regardless of the defendant's wishes. (In Maryland the question of whether a defendant could waive the right to automatic review of the sentence had not been addressed; and in Wyoming neither the statute nor case law clearly precluded a waiver of an appeal.) If either the conviction or the sentence was vacated, the case could be remanded to the trial court for additional proceedings or for retrial. As a result of retrial or resentencing, the death sentence could be reimposed. Minimum age According to State attorney general offices, in 1993 nine jurisdictions did not specify a minimum age for which the death penalty could be imposed. In some States the minimum age was set forth in the statutory provisions that determine the age at which a juvenile may be transferred to criminal court for trial as an adult. Eleven States and the Federal prison system required a minimum age of 18. Sixteen States indicated an age of eligibility between 14 and 17. Characteristics of prisoners under sentence of death at yearend 1993 Thirty-four States and the Federal prison system held a total of 2,716 prisoners under sentence of death on December 31, 1993, a gain of 136 or 5.3% more than at the end of 1992). The Federal prison system count rose from 1 inmate at yearend 1992 to 6 at yearend 1993. Three States, which had 24% of the adult resident population reported 38% of the Nation's death row population: California (363), Texas (357), and Florida (324). Of the 35 jurisdictions with statutes authorizing the death penalty, New Hampshire and Wyoming had no one under a capital sentence and South Dakota, New Mexico, and Colorado had 3 or fewer. Fifty-five percent of all inmates under sentence of death were in Southern States--a region that contained 35% of the Nation's adults. For the West the percentages of all persons under sentence of death and of all adults in the residential population were about the same, whereas for the Northeast and Midwest the percentages of the population sentenced to execution were smaller than the percentages of the total adult population. U.S. resident Population of population persons under age 18 or older death sentence ____________________________________________________________ _____ U.S. total 100% 100% Northeast* 20 7 Midwest* 24 16 South 35 55 West 21 22 *Four of the nine States in the Northeast and 6 of the 12 States in the Midwest do not authorize capital sentences. In all four regions of the country the number of prisoners under sentence of death increased during 1993. The number rose by 56, or 4.0%, in the South; by 21, or 13.1%, in the Northeast; by 43 or 7.6%, in the West; and by 11, or 2.7%, in the Midwest. Among the 35 jurisdictions with prisoners under sentence of death at yearend 1993, 22 had more inmates than a year earlier; 7 had fewer inmates, and 6 had the same number. California had an increase of 30, followed by North Carolina (23), Pennsylvania (16), and Florida (11). Alabama had the largest decline (4). During 1993 the number of blacks under sentence of death rose by 78 (7.6%); the number of whites rose by 55 (3.6%); and the number of persons of other races (Native Americans and Asians or Pacific Islanders) rose by 3 (7.9%). The number of Hispanics sentenced to death rose from 199 to 206 during 1993. Sixteen Hispanics were received under sentence of death, 9 were removed from death row, and 4 were executed. Three-fourths of the Hispanics were incarcerated in 4 States: Texas (54), California (51), Florida (30), and Arizona (20). During 1993 the number of women sentenced to be executed increased from 34 to 35. Six women were received under sentence of death, 5 were removed from death row, and none was executed. Women were under sentence of death in 14 States, with Alabama, California, Florida, Illinois, and Oklahoma together holding over 57%. Women under sentence of death 12/31/93 ________________________________________________ State Total White Black ________________________________________________ Total 32 24 11 Alabama 4 2 2 California 4 3 1 Florida 4 3 1 Illinois 4 3 2 Oklahoma 4 3 1 Pennsylvania 3 1 2 Texas 3 2 1 Missouri 2 2 0 North Carolina 2 2 0 Arizona 1 1 0 Idaho 1 1 0 Mississippi 1 1 0 Nevada 1 0 1 Tennessee 1 1 0 Men were 98.7% (2,681) of all prisoners under sentence of death. Whites predominated (57.7%); blacks comprised 40.8%; and other races (1.5%) included 22 Native Americans, 16 Asian Americans, and 3 self-identified Hispanics. Among those for whom ethnicity was known, 7.6% were Hispanic. The race, sex, and Hispanic origin of those under sentence of death at yearend 1993 were as follows: White Black Other __________________________________________ Male 1 ,542 1,098 41 Hispanic 187 11 5 Female 24 11 0 Hispanic 2 1 0 Among inmates under sentence of death on December 31, 1993, for whom information on education was available, more than three-fourths had either completed high school (38.1%) or finished 9th, 10th, or 11th grade (38.1%). The percentage who had not gone beyond eighth grade (15.8%) was about twice as large as that of inmates who had attended some college (8.0%). The median level of education was the 11th grade. Of inmates under a capital sentence and with reported marital status, nearly half had never married; somewhat more than a fourth were married when they were sentenced; and a fourth were divorced, separated, or widowed. Among all inmates under sentence of death, 45.0% were age 30 to 39 on December 31, 1993, and 60.5% were age 25 to 39 . The median age was 35 years. Less than 1% were younger than 20 and about 3.5% were age 55 or older. The youngest offender under sentence of death was age 18 (born September 1975); the oldest was 78 (born September 1915). More than half of all inmates under sentence of death at yearend 1993 were age 20 to 29 at the time of their sentencing; about 3.9% were age 19 or younger; and 1.4% were age 55 or older. Entries and removals of persons under sentence of death Between January 1 and December 31, 1993, 30 State prison systems and the Federal prison system reported receiving 282 prisoners under sentence of death. Forty-four percent of the inmates were received in 4 States: California (33), Florida (32), North Carolina (32), and Texas (27). All 282 prisoners who had been received under sentence of death had been convicted of murder. By sex and race, 141 were white men, 129 were black men, 2 were Native American men, 1 was an Asian man, 3 were Hispanic men classified as "Other race" in Pennsylvania, 5 were white women, and 1 was a black woman. Of 282 new admissions, 15 were Hispanic men, and 1 was a Hispanic woman. Twenty-three States reported a total of 97 persons whose sentence of death was overturned or removed. Appeals courts vacated 50 sentences while upholding the convictions and vacated 39 sentences while overturning the convictions. Florida (12 exits) had the largest number of vacated capital sentences. Indiana reported one removal by post-conviction relief. Ohio reported two, and Missouri, Georgia, and Texas each reported one commutation of a death sentence. Louisiana and Idaho each removed one inmate from under sentence of death as the result of amendments to capital statutes. As of December 31, 1993, 49 of the 97 persons who were formerly under sentence of death were serving a reduced sentence (36 to life imprisonment, 12 to a sentence of more than 20 years, and 1 to 20 years or less), 23 were awaiting a new trial, 23 were awaiting resentencing, 1 had further prosecution dropped, and 1 was removed by an unspecified method. In addition, 11 persons died while under sentence of death in 1993. Eight of these deaths were from natural causes--two in Oklahoma, and one each in California, Georgia, Illinois, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Texas. Three suicides occurred--one each in California, Ohio, and Virginia. From 1977, the year after the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of revised State capital punishment laws, to 1993, a total of 4,259 persons entered prison under sentence of death. During the 17 years, 226 persons were executed, and 1,789 were removed from under a death sentence by appellate court decisions and reviews, commutations, or death.(The same individual may have received and been relieved of the death penalty several times.) Among individuals who received a death sentence between 1977 and 1993, 2,468 (57.9%) were white, 1,724 (40.5%) were black, and 67 (1.6%) were of other races. The distribution by race and Hispanic origin of the 1,789 inmates who were removed from death row between 1977 and 1993 was as follows: whites 937 (52.3%), blacks 747 (41.7%), Native Americans 17 (0.9%), Asians 8 (0.5%), and Hispanics 80 (4.5%). Of the 226 who were executed, 121 (53.5%) were white, 87 (38.5%) were black, 16 (7.1%) were Hispanic, and 2 (0.9%) were Native American. Criminal history of inmates under sentence of death in 1993 Among inmates under death sentences on December 31, 1993, for whom criminal history information was available, 67.9% had a history of felony convictions, including 9.1% with at least one previous homicide conviction. Among those for whom legal status at the time of the capital offense was reported, 42.3% had an active criminal justice status. Nearly half of these were on parole, while the others had charges pending, were on probation,were in prison or escapees, or had some other criminal justice status. Excluding those who had charges pending, nearly 1 in 3 were already under sentence for another crime when their capital offense occurred. In a number of States, being under sentence for another crime is considered an aggravating factor in capital sentencing. Criminal history patterns varied slightly by race and Hispanic origin. For example, 73.2% of blacks had prior felony conviction records compared to 64.8% of whites, and 60.9% of Hispanics. Relatively more blacks (10.2%) than whites (8.4%) or Hispanics (9.0%) had a prior homicide conviction; and a slightly higher proportion of whites (7.2%) and blacks (6.3%) than Hispanics (5.5%) had a charge pending at the time of their capital offense. The median time between the imposition of a death sentence and yearend 1993 was 67 months, and the mean time was 73 months. Overall, the average time for women was 4.3 years--about 70% as long as for men (6.1 years). On average, whites, blacks, and Hispanics had spent about the same amount of time under a sentence of death. Elapsed time since sentencing ___________________________________________ Mean Median Total 73 mos 67 mos Male 73 67 Female 51 37 White 74 68 Black 72 63 Hispanic 69 64 Since 1988 data have been collected on the number of death sentences imposed on each person entering prison under sentence of death. Among the 1,669 individuals received under sentence of death, about 1 in every 7 entered with 2 or more death sentences. Whites, blacks, and Hispanics had similar proportions of those with single or multiple death sentences. Executions According to data collected by the Federal Government since 1930, during the 64 years ending in 1993, a total of 4,085 persons were executed under civil authority. (Military authorities carried out an additional 160 executions between 1930 and 1993.) After the Supreme Court reinstated the death penalty in 1976, 21 States executed 226 prisoners: 1977 1 1986 18 1979 2 1987 25 1981 1 1988 11 1982 2 1989 16 1983 5 1990 23 1984 21 1991 14 1985 18 1992 31 1993 38 During this 17-year period, 5 States executed 163 prisoners: Texas (71), Florida (32), Virginia (22), Louisiana (21), and Georgia (17). These States acccounted for 72% of all executions. Between 1977 and 1993, 106 white non-Hispanic men, 72 black non-Hispanic men, 15 white Hispanic men, 1 black Hispanic man, 14 white men with Hispanic origin unknown, 15 black men with Hispanic origin unknown, 2 Native American men, and 1 white non- Hispanic woman were executed. During 1993 Texas carried out 17 executions; Virginia executed 5 persons; Missouri 4; Florida 3; Arizona, Delaware, and Georgia, 2 each; and California, Louisiana, and Washington State, 1 each. All persons executed in 1993 were male. Eighteen were non-Hispanic whites; 13 were non-Hispanic blacks; 4 were white Hispanics; 1 was white with Hispanic origin unknown; 1 was black with Hispanic origin unknown; and 1 was Native American. From 1977 to 1993 4,641 prisoners were under death sentences for varying lengths of time. The 226 executions accounted for 4.9% of all exits from sentences of death during the period. A total of 1,699 prisoners, or 36.6% of those at risk, received other dispositions. Relatively more whites (5.1%) and Hispanics (5.3%) than blacks (4.6%) were executed. However, a slightly larger proportion of blacks (37.4%) and whites (37.2%) than Hispanics (26.5 were removed from under a death sentence by means other than execution. Among prisoners executed between 1977 and 1993, the average time spent between the imposition of the most recent sentence received and execution was 7 years and 10 months. White prisoners had spent an average of 7 years and 5 months, and black prisoners, 8 years and 6 months. The 38 prisoners executed in 1993 were under sentence of death an average of 9 years and 5 months. For the 226 prisoners executed between 1977 and 1993, the most common methods of execution were electrocution (108) and lethal injection (108). Other methods were lethal gas (8), hanging (1), and a firing squad (1). Executions, 1977-93 ____________________________________________________________ ___ His- Native White Black panic American Asian ____________________________________________________________ ___ 121 87 16 2 0 Lethal injection 57 34 15 2 0 Electrocution 57 50 1 0 0 Lethal gas 5 3 0 0 0 Hanging 1 0 0 0 0 Firing squad 1 0 0 0 0 Appendix I. Current status of inmates under sentence of death, 1973-93 Between 1973 and 1993 a total of 4,984 persons were sentenced to death. For inmates received in each year, the table shows what occurred with respect to their sentence before December 31, 1993. For example, of the 254 persons who were sentenced to death in 1983, 23 had been executed, 10 had died while in confinement, 1 had been relieved of the death sentence because courts struck d own wholly or in part the statutes under which they were sentenced, 20 had their conviction overturned on appeal, 48 had their sentence overturned on appeal, 4 had their sentence commuted, 2 were removed from under sentence of death for other reasons, and 146 were still under a death sentence at yearend 1993. Of the 2,716 persons under sentence of death on December 31, 1993, 107 or 3.9% were sentenced prior to 1980. Of the 2,716 prisoners under sentence of death at yearend 1993, Indiana, Kentucky, Nebraska, and Tennessee had the inmates who had served the longest among all condemned inmates. By contrast, Oregon had no inmates sentenced prior to 1989, the Federal prison system prior to 1991, and South Dakota prior to 1992. The average time from sentence to December 31, 1993, for the 2,716 condemned inmates was 6 years and 1 month. Appendix II. Federal laws providing for the death penalty Between 1972, when the Supreme Court in Furman v Georgia struck down the death penalty as then applied, and yearend 1993, Congress enacted four death penalty statutes: *A) Any person engaging in or working in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise, or any person engaging in an offense punishable under section 841(b)(1)(A) or section 960(b)(1) who intentionally kills or counsels, commands, induces, procures, or causes the intentional killing of an individual and such killing results, shall be sentenced to any term of imprisonment, which shall not be less than 20 years, and which may be up to life imprisonment, or may be sentenced to death; and (B) any person, during the commission of, in furtherance of, or while attempting to avoid apprehension, prosecution or service of a prison sentence for, a felony violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter who intentionally kills or counsels, commands, induces, procures, or causes the intentional killing of any Federal, State, or local law enforcement officer engaged in, or on account of, the performance of such officer's official duties and such killing results, shall be sentenced to any term of imprisonment, which shall not be less than 20 years, and which may be up to life imprisonment, or may be sentenced to death (21 U.S.C. 848(e). *Espionage by a member of the Armed Forces: communication of information to a foreign government relating to nuclear weaponry, military spacecraft or satellites, early warning systems, war plans, communications intelligence or cryptographic information, or any other major weapons or defense strategy (10 U.S.C. 906(a)). *Witness tampering where death results (18 U.S.C. 1512). *Death resulting from aircraft hijacking (49 U.S.C. 1472 and 1473). The following capital punishment provisions, which were enacted prior to the Furman decision, remain in the United States Code: *Murder while a member of the Armed Forces (10 U.S.C. 918). *Destruction of aircraft, motor vehicles, or related facilities resulting in death (18 U.S.C. 32-34). *Retaliatory murder of a member of the immediate family of law enforcement officials (18 U.S.C. 115(b)(3) [by cross-reference to 18 U.S.C. 1111]). *Murder of a member of Congress, an important executive official, or a Supreme Court Justice (18 U.S.C. 351 [by cross-reference to 18 U.S.C. 1111]). *Espionage (18 U.S.C. 794). *Destruction of government property resulting in death (18 U.S.C. 844(f)(d)(i)). *First-degree murder (18 U.S.C. 1111). *Mailing of injurious articles with the intent to kill or resulting in death (18 U.S.C. 1716). *Assassination or kidnaping resulting in the death of the President or Vice President (18 U.S.C. 1751 [by cross-reference to 18 U.S.C. 1111]). *Willful wrecking of a train resulting in death (18 U.S.C. 1992). *Bank-robbery-related murder or kidnaping (18 U.S.C. 2113). * Treason (18 U.S.C. 2381). * Murder of Federal judges and officers (18 U.S.C. 1114). Methodological note The statistics reported in this Bulletin may differ from data collected by other organizations for a variety of reasons: (1) National Prisoner Statistics (NPS) adds inmates to the number under sentence of death not at sentencing but at the time they are admitted to a State or Federal correctional facility. (2) If in one year inmates entered prison under a death sentence or were reported as being relieved of a death sentence but the court had acted in the previous year, the counts are adjusted to reflect the dates of court decisions. (See the note for the affected jurisdictions.) (3) NPS counts for capital punishment are always for the last day of the calendar year and will differ from counts for more recent periods. 1993 Supreme Court decisions cited Dobbs v. Zant, 113 S.Ct. 835 (1993). Decided January 19, 1993. Graham v. Collins, 113 S.Ct. 892 (1993). Decided January 25, 1993. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S.Ct. 853 (1993). Decided January 25, 1993. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S.Ct. 838 (1993). Decided January 25, 1993. Delo v. Lashley, 113 S.Ct. 1222 (1993). Decided March 8, 1993. Arave v. Creech, 113 S.Ct. 1534 (1993). Decided March 30, 1993. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S.Ct. 2078 (1993). Decided June 1, 1993. Godinez v. Moran, 113 S.Ct. 2680 (1993). Decided June 24, 1993. Johnson v. Texas, 113 S.Ct. 2658 (1993). Decided June 24, 1993. Other cases cited Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978). Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990). Collins v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 258 (CA8), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1013, 106 S.Ct. 546, 88 L.Ed.2d 475 (1985). Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). This BJS Bulletin was written by James Stephan, BJS Statistician, and Peter Brien, Statistical Assistant, under the supervision of Allen J. Beck. Tracy Snell gave computing assistance. Priscilla Middleton assisted with graphs. Tom Hester edited the report. Marilyn Marbrook supervised production, assisted by Jodi Brown, Yvonne Boston, and Jayne Robinson. At the Bureau of the Census, Rhonda Carney collected the data under the supervision of Gertrude Odom. December 1994, NCJ-150042 Owning Topic : T= 202 E= 649 Type = d T=Corrections - 196 E= 649 Type = e