

POLICE RESPONSE  
TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

FINAL REPORT

For  
Bureau of Justice Statistics  
Grant #87BJ-CX-KO18



Governor Michael S. Dukakis  
Commonwealth of Massachusetts  
Committee on Criminal Justice  
Statistical Analysis Center

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## POLICE RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This research project focuses on one specific area in the larger topic of domestic violence: what is the police response when a call is classified as 'domestic' in nature? To determine answer to this question, data were collected from a random sample of police agencies in Massachusetts over a three month period. Police log books were examined to classify all calls for service during that period in order to determine the overall work-load of the agency. Brief training was provided to officers to instruct them to complete an incident reporting form when a domestic call was received. Officers then filled out these forms upon responding to such calls. UCR data on domestic homicides were also examined.

The findings of the research are as follows:

o Police receive a very large number of calls for all types of services, ranging from the most serious crimes through a variety of order-maintaining functions to a variety of service functions.

o Calls received specifically for 'family trouble' or 'family disturbance' make up a small number of the overall calls for service in the communities studied, but they become more prevalent for the larger cities.

o Nearly 1/3 of all domestic calls were repeat calls for service, i.e., the responding officers were aware of prior calls to the same address.

o Of the domestic calls for service reported, police 'cleared' the call by arresting the offending party in roughly 8 percent of the cases, a figure similar to other states not having a mandatory arrest policy.

o Massachusetts does permit an abused spouse to obtain a court order mandating the removal of the abusing partner (a so-called '209A' order). In those cases where a court order was in effect, arrest occurred in 23 percent of the cases. Where the court order was not in effect, arrest occurred in 4.9 percent of the cases.

o Of the various outcomes which were recorded, the following were the most prevalent:

"Advised victim of rights"	19.6%
"Referred"	11.5%
"Arrest"	7.5%
"Other - Not specified"	7.7%

o There was no reported injury to officer or damage to departmental property in any of the calls recorded. There was injury to victims in 38.8 percent of the total cases and in 50 percent of cases involving 209A restraining orders. Minor injury to the offender was reported in 16.2 percent of the cases.

Since data were collected in a variety of police agencies, the above varied a great deal from the average for all departments. The total number of cases of domestic violence which were coded for any one agency is small and no definitive statements can be made about particular agencies. However, rates of arrest ranged from 0 percent to 35.7 percent of all the cases handled.

The report recommends specific issues for which statutes need to be clarified, particularly with respect to the following:

- o the degree of discretion intended for arrest policies
- o extent of police liability under false arrest or failure to arrest situations
- o probable cause interviewing of potential child victims

In addition there needs to be greater attention to alternative interventions available to the officers when arrest does not occur. Greater coordination between arrest policy and resource allocation is also needed.



## DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS A POLICE PROBLEM

Police agencies act in a variety of roles: enforcing the laws, maintaining order, responding to a wide variety of real and/or imagined offenses. The vast workload which police are forced to deal with is due, in part, to the fact that, in most communities and at any time of the day or night, the voice at the other end of the telephone is the only agency available to the caller. Police are therefore the 'first choice' for the citizen to turn to in any number of situations.

Although the perception of the public is that police 'fight crime', it is a truism in the academic community that only a small percentage of police work deals with that high-profile assignment. The typical breakdown of calls for service is given as 15 to 20 percent crime related, with the remaining 80 to 85 percent concerned with 'service' calls - motorist aid, bank escorts, etc.

Over the past several years, the perception has developed that domestic violence is an endemic crime which impacts in a major way on local law enforcement. Some reports have stated that as much as 20 percent of all calls are related to domestic violence (Kansas City Preventative Patrol Experiment, Wilt & Bannon, 1986). There is also a perception that such calls are

dangerous to law enforcement personnel, with a high level of violence and threat directed against them (Loring, 1980). Domestic violence calls are also thought to be repetitive - e.g., persons who call police for domestic violence are likely to have done so in the past and are also likely to do so in the future (Wilt & Bannon, 1976).

The current state of knowledge of the nature and extent of domestic violence calls, and the police response to such calls, is based in large part on anecdotal information similar to the above. There are few systematic studies which have been done dealing in whole or in part on these issues. A brief check of the available literature reinforces this perception. In addition, some of the most recent overviews and empirical studies put forward contradictory points of view.

In a report published by the National Institute of Justice, an examination was made of FBI data dealing with police officer death in work-related events. "Police intervention in disputes between family members is frequently cited as a routine police assignment that is particularly dangerous." (Garner & Clemmer, 1986). For Massachusetts, 13 percent of all homicides start from domestic disputes. Disputes also account for nearly one third of assaults on officers (Crime Reporting Unit, 1987). However, in a national study domestic violence was at the bottom

of the list (Garner & Clemmer, 1986) of calls which resulted in officer deaths. "Because police are dispatched more frequently to some types of incidents than others, ... (the researchers) controlled for the amount of officer activity associated with five different types of incidents - domestic disturbance, other disturbance, robbery, burglary, and traffic - and again examined the danger experienced by responding officers. Their findings suggest that robberies represent the greatest risk of officer death, assault, or injury, while domestic violence is among the incidents posing the smallest risk of death (Crime Reporting Unit, 1987). Even so, twenty percent of officer deaths nationally are reported as occurring as part of domestic violence calls for service (Loring, 1980).

The research findings are not entirely consistent regarding the dangerousness of domestic disturbances. The assessment of how dangerous these crimes are depends, in part, on what criteria for measuring dangerousness are chosen. More information is needed to resolve these inconsistent findings. Consequently, there is a need for basic descriptive information on the nature and dangerousness of domestic violence events. There is also a need to understand how police respond to the circumstances of the events and circumstances under which they arrest offenders. Doing so will help to refine policing policy

and procedures to reduce the recurrence and severity of these events.

#### ARREST POLICIES

A great deal of research is being done on the effect that aggressive arrest policies have in combating the cyclical assault pattern of domestic assault. There is growing national agreement among battered women's advocates, victims and criminal justice professionals that early and decisive intervention by the police in domestic violence cases effectively diminishes repeat calls and may save lives or prevent further injuries. Protection of the victim, and often the protection of her children as well, is seen as the immediate and primary concern of police officers. Police note that arrest and removal of the offender from an often volatile and hostile domestic situation can provide the most effective means of ensuring that protection. Upon arresting the offender officers observe that the crisis immediately abates and the victim is then encouraged to seek help either from family, friends, shelter, hospitals or counselors.

A recent amendment ( in January 1988) to Chapter 209 A, the Abuse Prevention Act, and various legislative bills filed this year embody one of three different approaches to arrest in

domestic violence incidents. The three approaches are: mandatory arrest, pro-arrest and permissive arrest.

### Mandatory Arrest

A mandatory arrest approach mandates that in incidents of domestic assault police must arrest whenever probable cause exists. An often misunderstood idea in the approach is that police will lose discretion in the arrest procedures. In fact proponents argue that police continue to have much discretion in deciding if probable cause exists. They reason that if upon investigation an officer determines that a crime has clearly been committed and there is probable cause to believe a suspect committed it, then and only then is arrest mandatory. Proponents also believe that an argument, that a mandatory arrest approach clarifies police roles is more accurate. No longer will police be expected to act as mediators and counselors. Arrest based on probable cause ultimately emphasizes an officer's strictly law enforcement duty.

This policy raises the issue of liability more so than others. As a result of the 1985 Thurman vs. Torrington, Connecticut, 2.3 million liability judgment, in which a battered woman successfully argued that police did not protect her adequately from a brutal assault by her husband, Connecticut

enacted a mandatory arrest law. It followed the states of Washington, Oregon, Ohio and Maine add the cities of Concord, N.H., Pittsburgh, PA. and Charleston, S.C.. Officials in Middlesex County in Massachusetts also appear to be taking this position. In most of these states and cities police immunity was enacted by statute. Proponents further argue that discriminatory arrest based on minority group or socioeconomic status will be less likely as a result of the standardized enforcement.

Some opponents argue that a mandatory arrest approach is too much of a departure for the system. Initially increased case loads would cause a strain upon the court system. In most instances this would prove to be true. However, with additional and proper planning of resources this problem would eventually be alleviated.

#### Pro-Arrest Approach

A pro-arrest policy assumes and encourages arrest as the appropriate response in domestic violence incidents. Approximately 25 states have implemented this approach. Proponents argue that it leaves a degree of discretion to the arresting officer in his decision to arrest. However in many municipalities with this approach officers must indicate their reasoning in writing if they choose not to arrest. Proponents also argue

that this approach allows for individual counties and cities to implement their own policies. An example is Concord, New Hampshire where the city's police department chose to institute its own policy of mandatory arrest whereas the state as a whole did not.

Opponents argue however that although this method allows for greater freedom of choice for individual departments, the result often leaves a state with less standardized enforcement. Also, some argue that mandatory arrest policies are bound to result in many departments in incremental time periods. Therefore it would be more expedient to proceed with a statewide policy at the outset, thus leaving less likelihood of a civil suit as a result of unequal enforcement.

#### Permissive Arrest

Currently, Massachusetts law follows a permissive approach to arrest under Chapter 209A, the Abuse Prevention Act (see appendix on comparative state statutes for citation). Police are mandated to respond in some way to domestic violence incidents by e.g. providing a victim with assistance in acquiring medical or shelter services and by informing a victim of her rights to legal redress.

Proponents argue that this method offers the most dis-

cretion in arrests. The variety of arrests procedures include arrest on probable cause if a felony has been committed and arrest if a restraining order has been violated. However, as previously stated a significant change occurred in January 1988 with an amendment to Chapter 209 A. regarding misdemeanor arrests. Whereas the law required in misdemeanors that police witness an assault and battery to make a warrantless arrest, the new amendment permits arrest on probable cause without police witnessing the assault and battery. Police departments statewide are questioning if in fact the new amendment mandates arrest. Opponents argue that this method also results in less standardized enforcement.

#### Dual Arrest

In addition to these three arrest policies, a number of jurisdictions found that after promoting domestic violence arrests there were increasing numbers of domestic violence incidents in which police were arresting both victim and offender. In many cases this was a result of officers assessments that both parties exhibited injuries. In view of this problem some states (e.g. Washington) have included self-defense and "primary aggressor" language in their abuse statutes. Washington's statute states that "only the primary physical aggressor" should



be arrested. The pattern of dual arrests in Washington has thus dropped substantially and has ceased to be a serious problem.

Currently in Massachusetts there is a bill (S. 690 Senator Amick and Representative Tucker) which proposes similar language. Proponents argue that the language is needed in order to further clarify the statute to prevent unfair arrests of the victim. However opponents of the measure argue that effective police training would better address the issue and that adding this language to the statute is unnecessary. They maintain that if police follow proper guidelines to investigate probable cause, only the perpetrator of the offense will be arrested.

In the incident survey reported below, one of the calls resulted in the arrest of the victim as well as the perpetrator. This represents seven percent of the arrests under a discretionary policy. In a mandatory or pro-arrest situation the statistics could be very different, especially since 16 percent of the perpetrators were also injured by the violence they initiated.

## ARREST CONSEQUENCES

A number of consequences have been suggested as resulting from more aggressive arrest policies for domestic violence cases. Among them are: reduced homicides, lower recidivism of violence, less child abuse, and fewer officer injuries.

### Reduced Homicide

An aspect seldom noted in the overall view of domestic violence is the involvement of "extended" family members in the domestic violence cycle. Massachusetts homicide rates for 1986 and 1987 (See Appendix A) indicate that a family or household member was murdered every ten days in Massachusetts. Not only are spouses and children being killed but aunts, cousins and in-laws. In one case a grandmother was killed by her grandchild.

Arrest policies and procedures should apply equally in all types of domestic violence incidents, whether in the close nuclear unit or the extended one. In 1984 the town of Newport News, Virginia (a shipbuilding and Navy port city of 157,000) found that fifty percent of their homicide cases (14 out of 28) involved family members and that in half of those cases police had previously responded to complaints of domestic violence. When mandatory arrest procedures were instituted the domestic

violence homicide rate dropped to just one in the first six months of 1986.

#### Lower Recidivism

Statistics show that 40-60% of all police response calls are domestic violence related. A 1977 Police Foundation study in Kansas City showed that officers had responded previously to disturbance calls at least once at the homes of couples involved in 85% of domestic assault and homicide cases, and at least five times to 50% of these couples.

When arrest was ordered by department policy in Duluth, Minnesota the recidivism rate decreased by 47%. In Minneapolis a 1984 study showed that where police showed up and made an arrest in a domestic violence incident the six month recidivism rate was 10% as compared to a 24% rate when police simply sent the abusers out of the home for a "cooling off" period.

#### Less Child Abuse

In the past domestic violence issues have primarily focused on batterers and their adult victims. However there is increasing evidence that the effects of witnessing domestic violence or being physically abused themselves is having a serious effect on the children in domestic violence households.

a.) The Special Commission on Violence Against Children reports that in 1986-87 one child died each month in Massachusetts as a result of abuse or neglect.

b.) In a 1985 study of female abuse by the Hazeldon Foundation, it was reported that of boys aged eleven to twenty years old who committed homicide in the U.S., 63 percent murdered the man who was abusing their mother.

c.) Preliminary reports from the Boston Children's Hospital Child Abuse AWAKE PROGRAM indicate that 70% of the severely abused children in the program have mothers who are battered. This suggests that battering of women could also indicate the presence of child abuse. This is consistent with a 1985 study by sociologists Stark and Flitcraft that indicated that "women battering is the single most important context of child abuse." As noted below from the incident survey, a number of children are injured by domestic violence in addition to the adult victim.

d.) The 1985 Massachusetts DYS study Delinquent Youth and Family Violence indicated that the safety of children

is likely to result when an offender is removed from the house. The report also stated that experiencing family violence in childhood is correlated with higher rates of juvenile delinquency, violence, alcohol and drug abuse. Children also experience feelings of severe anxiety and helplessness when they witness repeated violence directed at their mothers. Often this is a harbinger of serious emotional problems in adult life.

Proponents argue that arrest and removal of an offender from a violent home not only provides immediate protection for children and their mothers, it also sends a clear message to youth that violence in the home will not be tolerated by the law enforcement system. This intervention can also be the child's first message that he does not have to accept violence against his own person. This heightens self-esteem and can be the first step in a often difficult road to recovery.

#### Fewer Officer Injuries

Duluth, Minnesota experienced a dramatic decrease in the number of police injuries involved in domestic violence incidents upon implementation of mandatory arrest policies. Chief LeRoy Bangham of the Farmington, Connecticut police department reasoned in a June 1986 article in The Police Chief journal that "finding probable cause usually takes less time than it does to

mediate the crisis and less time at the scene means less possibility of injury to the officer."

### Impact on the System

If mandatory or pro-arrest policies are instituted it is crucial that a comprehensive program be in place to effectively deal with the increase in the projected caseload in courts, battered women's shelters, and counseling programs.

When Connecticut enacted its mandatory arrest law in the 12 months following the law's implementation there was a 92% increase (from 12,439 to 23,830) in cases referred by the court to the Family Division of the Superior Court. (Family Violence Program Cumulative Report). In the first nine months of the law's implementation, the state's domestic violence projects experienced an 88% increase in hotlines calls for crisis counseling (Testimony of Connecticut Coalition Against Domestic Violence).

Fortunately, Connecticut had statutorily provided for an increase in funding to these support systems. Thus programs were ready and in place when the law went into effect. In the event that domestic violence arrests increase substantially as a result of changing arrest policy, a comprehensive program for Massachusetts will need to include the following:

a.) Training - Police, judges and court personnel (such as victim witness advocates and probation officers) would need training in domestic violence procedures. Victim witness advocates will especially be needed to assist and counsel victims through the complaint stages. Many victims, when they are supported and encouraged to proceed with prosecution are less likely to drop charges out of fear or discouragement.

b.) Mandated Therapy - Without effective court counseling programs in place for both offender and victims the cycle of family violence will continue to persist, Connecticut now has mandatory counseling of abusers and the Quincy District Court Family Service Unit and the DOVE shelter have recently piloted a program that mandates therapy for offenders and offers support groups for victims. This type of pro-active approach is what is needed in order for family's to become aware and take advantage of counseling programs.

c.) Battered Women's Shelters - Funds for expansion of shelter services must be increased. Already shelters in Massachusetts are understaffed and their resources taxed to the limit. Shelters in Massachusetts report that four out of five

requests for shelter are refused due to a lack of resources. A possible source for funding is the Battered Women's Trust Fund Bill. It is being reintroduced this year in the legislature. Fines would be assessed on all restraining orders and would be utilized for domestic violence programs in both the courts and battered women's shelters.

## RESEARCH METHODS

### MULTIPLE STRATEGIES

Several different data collection strategies are necessary to adequately examine police responses to domestic violence. Four primary sources of data will be used by this study: UCR homicide statistics and LEOKA data, police log calls for service ("Grid" data), in depth qualitative interviews with officers who handle these calls, and incident code forms filled out by officers responding to domestic disturbance calls. Each source of data will provide different information that, taken together, provides a more complete picture.

UCR data will provide overall population figures for the broad description of the problem, especially for the more extreme outcomes for victims and officers. This will include data from Return A, Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR), and reports



of Law Enforcement Officers Killed or Assaulted (LEOKA).

Grid data will provide population information on requests for service in the departments studied. It will allow examining the effects of these calls on work load and comparing the original classification of the call with that at clearance.

The qualitative interviews will provide in depth information on the experience and perceptions of the officers regarding these cases. It will be especially useful when interpreting the meaning of the findings.

The incident code forms will be filled out by officers responding to domestic disturbance calls. They will provide detailed information on characteristics of the incident, persons involved, and outcomes of the call.

#### INCIDENT SURVEY

The incident survey is based on information supplied by officers responding to domestic disturbance calls in a sample of communities in Massachusetts, stratified by size of the community. A sample of three small, three medium, and three large police departments was randomly selected. One agency of the nine selected refused participation. In the eight remaining departments, two different types of data were collected for a three-month period, October to December, 1986. For this period,

the police logs were examined to determine the actual nature and extent of calls for service for different time periods during the day (Grid data). In addition, after brief instruction, officers were asked to fill out a one page incident reporting form upon responding to any family disturbance call (survey data).

These eight agencies represent a range of characteristics. They differ on size, geographic location in the state, police resources, and crime rates (see Table 1). They also vary in the incidence of domestic violence calls.

The majority of the police agencies (five of the eight participating agencies) were using a standardized incident coding form, and have a protocol which requires that it be filled out when responding to certain classes of activity. However, 'family disturbances' were not one of these response codes. Subsequent to this study Massachusetts passed a law requiring a "domestic violence" checkoff box on incident coding forms. At the time of the study, these standard incident coding forms gave inadequate detail for the purpose of this research. In consultation with other researchers, a specialized data coding form was developed (see appendix). Two hundred and twenty family violence incidents were coded as a result of this data collection.

It must be stated that it is not possible to know if all

domestic violence calls for service were actually coded. It is clear that a process of "redefinition" is an on-going fact of the police response. Calls received by the dispatcher and recorded on the police log as being of a certain type - 'family disturbance', 'juveniles drinking in park', 'noisy party', etc. - may be classified differently upon investigation or clearance of the call. These cases are responded to by the line officer who may clear them as the same type of call as originally recorded, or as some type of incident, or may simply state 'no problem seen', 'nobody present', etc.

Domestic violence calls for service make up a small part of these departments' workload. The largest department surveyed, serving a population of approximately 90,000, averaged 1.65 calls per day during the three-month period under examination.

Department	Total # DV Calls	Daily Average
2	152	1.65
8	78	0.84
5	60	0.65
3	54	0.58
4	44	0.47
1	33	0.35
7	29	0.31
6	2	0.02
Total:	452	4.91

The total number of calls of all types received also varied, and somewhat more widely than with domestic calls. In general, the larger the department, the larger the percentage of cases were taken up by domestic disturbance calls. They comprised 0.3 percent of the smallest department calls, 1.6 percent of the largest moderate sized department in the sample, and 20 percent of all calls for Boston.

Department	Total All Calls	Daily Average
2	9340	101.5
5	7848	85.3
8	5150	55.9
4	3142	34.1
3	3103	33.7
6	2423	26.3
1	2414	26.2
7	1878	20.4
Total:	35288	383.6

The characteristics of police work are determined in part by developmental policies - the mix of proactive and reactive patrolling which the force deals with, its visibility in the community, the relationship of the department with the larger community. Obviously, the work is determined, in part,

by the nature and extent of criminal activities in the community. The police workload is also dependent, in some measure, on the desire of local citizens to involve the agency in their problems, and the availability of other social service agencies to handle parts of citizen needs. Nowhere may this be as true as in the area of domestic violence (at least in the perception of some of the police chiefs contacted during the course of this study).

Police work involves a variety of quasi-therapeutic interventions, ranging from dispute resolution to marital counseling. As mentioned earlier, police agencies in many communities are the only public sector agency staffed and open at all times. For those communities, the police may be the first and only source of aid in a large number of situations. This may be due to the economic status of the community. It may also be due part to the economic well-being of the citizenry.<sup>1</sup> In some communities, other services may be available - mental health clinics, hospital emergency wards, or shelters.

This is not to say that the economic well-being of the community correlates with the availability of services, as high-

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1 It has been stated that in some cases of domestic violence, the abused party is unable to remove him/herself from the current living situation due to lower economic status and lack of resources to pay for the move and new lodgings.

ly insular upper-class areas may be deficient in some public services taken for granted in the inner city (e.g., city hospital emergency wards). At the same time, more well-to-do victims of domestic violence may remove themselves from the offending situation. There may also be the perception that people 'like us' don't involve the police in personal family problems.

For any of the above reasons, the raw numbers of calls received by the police agency may not be the best indicator of the seriousness of domestic violence in the community. They do, however, indicate the extent to which the officers must deal with these cases.

#### DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS A REPETITIVE POLICE PROBLEM

Since a number of different police officers could, over time, respond to particular addresses, basing conclusions on the memories of uniformed police officers is somewhat problematic. Officer A who dealt with the problem yesterday or last shift may not be on duty at the time the next call for service is received. Officer B may not be aware that the service was rendered at some time in the past. Of course, if a household is a chronic problem, then many officers may be aware of the prior situation.

In the current sample, nearly one in three of all calls

were recognized as repetitive in nature (31.7%, see table 4). This is similar to the six month recidivism rate reported for spouse abusers by the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics (1988, p. 17). To the extent that it may be possible to develop a 'profile' of households prone to domestic violence, police administrators may be able to focus services on high risk households. This recall method of identifying repetitive domestic violence is, undoubtedly a lower bounds estimate of the true degree of repetition, particularly for households that have had prior contact with the police for whatever reason. In contrast to the one third repetition reported by recall, historical data for 911 emergency calls in Boston between 1977 and 1982 indicate that nearly three-fifths of households having 911 domestic disturbance calls repeat (see Tables 2 and 3).

#### DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT

##### SEX OF OFFENDER

The problem of domestic violence has been seen as primarily one impacting women. The current research supports that view. More than four out of five (86%) of all offenders were male (see Table 4). However, the problem of domestic violence, and any potential solutions of this problem should

focus on women as well. Over 13 percent of the offenders were female. This is a smaller percentage than female offenders who killed their current or former spouses or lovers in Massachusetts between 1986 and 1987, according to SHR data. Nearly twenty percent of the homicides between current or former "partners" was committed by women, eighty percent by men (see Table 5). Qualitative interviews with officers also indicates a reluctance to arrest when both parties are mutually assaultive (Steenman, 1988) or to arrest both offender and victim.

#### INJURY TO VICTIM

Minor injuries were reported to the victim in 34.2 percent of all cases, a figure twice as great as that found in an Ohio study (Bell, 1985). Detailed information on the nature and extent of injury was requested. The outcome of the injury was specifically coded - e.g., whether immediate medical attention or hospitalization was required (since in either case the responding officer would be aware of that outcome). These outcomes were indicated in 4.4 percent of the cases.

In a number of cases there was more than one victim injured. Of those cases involving more than one victim, a third were injured by the offender. All of these additional injured were children.



**LOCATION OF INCIDENT**

Most of the disturbances occurred in the home or apartment of the victim (81%). The next most frequent location was on the street or in a park (11%). Slightly less often a bar or restaurant was the site of the disturbance (8%).

**TIME OF INCIDENT**

Most of the incidents occurred in the evening between 4PM and midnight (57.3%). The rest were distributed between late night and daytime, with slightly more between midnight and 8AM than between 8AM and 4PM (25.1% late night, 17.6% daytime). Reports were more frequent at or after some common mealtimes (except for breakfast). The most frequent calls came between 7PM and 8PM, followed by 1AM to 2AM, and noon to 1PM (19%, 13.5%, and 5.5%, respectively). This finding is not surprising, given that meals can be an occasion for negative interaction as well as positive.

**WEAPON USAGE**

According to the police, some type of weapon was involved in the domestic violence in 41 percent of all cases. The most common weapons were the obvious, hands/fists and feet,

which were coded in 28.7 percent of cases. Knives were indicated in 4.3 percent of cases, followed by blunt objects (1.4%) and guns (1.0%). The extensiveness of weapons being present underscores the threat these situations represent for victims and officers.

#### COURT ORDER IN FORCE

Massachusetts state law permits battered or abused persons to obtain a court order (Chapter 209A, "Abuse Prevention") '....requesting protection from such abuse....' (M.G.L., Ch 209A sec 7:20-21) '....Each such order issued shall contain the following statement: VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE.' (M.G.L., Ch 209A sec 3:2-3). The violation of this civil complaint carries with it fairly substantial penalties - fines up to \$5,000 or imprisonment for up to 2 1/2 years. In addition, although it is not stated specifically within the statute, there is a strong presumption that the violation of a 209A court order calls for the arrest of the offending party. A 209A court order was in force and known to the police in 7.2 percent of all cases.

## RESPONDING TO THE CALL

A variety of people called in the report. Like other studies (Berk and Sherman, 1984; Bell 1985), wives were most likely to call (19%, see Table 4). "Other relatives" (including grandparents and children as well as more distant relatives), anonymous, and girlfriends were most likely to make the report (14.5%, 10.0%, and 9.5% respectively). Husbands and boyfriends rarely reported domestic violence or a domestic disturbance (2.3% each). Reports were slightly more frequent at breakfast, lunch, and evening meal hours, with the evening increase extending beyond traditional meal hours.

Calls for domestic disturbance occurred more frequently in the evening between 4 PM and midnight (56.2% of the calls). Late night and daytime hours produced calls equally less often (23.2% between midnight and 8 AM, 20.7 % between 8 AM and 4 PM).

Usually two officers responded to the call (mean = 2.1). In these communities a backup officer was frequently present (mean number 0.9). It took an average of 19 minutes to respond to the call. Once on the scene, approximately 40 minutes were needed before the case was cleared. The length of time on the scene was not related to whether an arrest occurred.

## OUTCOME OF CALL

The most frequent resolution of domestic violence calls was to "Advise victim of rights." This occurred in 19.6 percent of all cases. The second most frequent response was "Restored peace," which occurred 11.5 percent of the time. The arrest or taking into protective custody of the offending party occurred in 7.7 percent of the cases. The arrest rate is similar to that reported in other studies (Bell, 1985; Langley & Levy, 1987; Roy, 1977). The arrest rate was similar to the percentage of victims who expressed preference for arrest.

## INJURY TO OFFICERS

In light of the NIJ research quoted earlier, it is perhaps surprising that in none of the cases studied were officers injured. Since this was one of the concerns of the research, we also asked whether any 'departmental equipment' was damaged or destroyed. The assumption was that damaged equipment, torn uniforms and the like could act as proxies to the dangerousness of the situation.<sup>2</sup> In none of the cases coded was there any

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<sup>2</sup> And that some officers may not respond as truthfully about minor injury. Some departmental policies known to us make the reporting of on-the-job injury a serious and problematic concern to officers.

damage reported. The data do not say how many of the officers were assaulted but uninjured.

#### FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH ARREST

Some of the literature which deals with spousal abuse advocate the removal of the offending party from the house through arrest as the "best" short and long-term solution to the problem. Women's advocates have called for legislation mandating arrest. Research done in the Minneapolis police department and elsewhere indicates that arrest proves the more effective solution to domestic violence than either mediation, telling one of the parties to leave, or leaving warnings or citations (Berk & Sherman, 1988; Steinman, 1988). In this sample, however, arrest was an infrequent response to domestic violence, occurring in about 8 percent of the cases (see Table 6). What factors are related to the police decision to arrest?

Crosstabulation, analysis of variance, and logistic regression analysis were used to answer this question. The crosstabs and the ANOVA were used to examine the bivariate association of arrest with qualitative and quantitative variables, respectively. Six factors were associated with arrest in the bivariate analysis. Logistic regression was used to examine the

relationship between these factors and arrest in a multivariate context and to see which factors no longer remain associated with arrest with other variables are statistically controlled. The six correlates of arrest identified by crosstabs and ANOVA are: violation of 209A court order, presence of a witness, location of the incident, race of offender, speed of the victim in making the report, and number of officers present on the scene. These six variables -- plus repeat call, presence of a weapon, injury of the victim, and involvement of children -- were entered in the logistic regression. The following sections report both the bivariate associations and the multivariate logistic results.

#### Repeat Call

Although nearly one third of all calls reported were repeat in nature (see Table 2), this variable did not have much predictive power in determining whether an arrest would occur. Over nine percent of the cases in which repeat calls had been received resulted in an arrest, compared to 7.1 percent of non-repeat calls addressed. There was no statistically significant relationship between arrest and repeated calls for domestic disturbance.

### Violation of a Court Order

Violation of a standing 209A court order shows the strongest relationship to the subsequent arrest of the offending party. Arrests were made in 4.9 percent of cases where there was not a 209A in force (see Table 6). When there was a court order in force, arrests occurred in 23.1 percent of cases. This relationship was statistically significant at the 5 percent level using crosstabulation, meaning that such a relationship would occur by chance less than 5 percent of the time. This relationship remained significant after controlling for other possible factors using logistic regression analysis (see Table 7). Results of the logistic regression indicate that police were more than one and a half times as likely to arrest when a 209A order was present.

### Presence of Witness

The presence of witnesses during the incident had a statistically significant bivariate relationship. Arrests occurred in 18 percent of the cases in which a witness was present. However, when a witness was not present, an arrest was made in only 3.2 percent of the cases. Since the presence of children was not related to arrest, some of them were not "witnesses" to the violence. This may only mean, however, that they

were not present in the room when the violence occurred or were too young to give reliable information. When other factors were controlled in the logistic regression analysis, the presence of a witness did not affect the odds of an arrest.

#### Weapon Involvement

The use of a weapon during a domestic violence incident, surprisingly, did not have a statistically significant relationship to subsequent arrest. Although an arrest was made in 11.9 percent of the cases in which a weapon was present, as opposed to 4.9 percent of the cases without a weapon, this difference did not reach statistical significance using a chi-square test of association. The point biserial correlation between weapon involvement and arrest was statistically significant ( $r=.17$ ,  $p=.03$ ). This weak association with arrest disappeared when other factors were controlled in the logistic regression analysis.

#### Location of Disturbance

Domestic disturbances on streets or in parks were most likely to result in arrest, 21 percent. Disputes in bars or restaurants were least likely, 0 percent; with disturbances in homes or apartments in between, 6.7 percent. The arrest dif-



ference between "outside" places like streets and "inside" places like bars and restaurants needs further investigation, since both imply the disturbance is no longer a "private" matter. It could, however, be a spurious artifact, since the association disappeared when controls were introduced in the logistic regression analysis.

#### Race of Offender

When the arrests of whites, blacks, and Hispanics are examined separately, there is no statistically significant difference in arrest by race. However, if whites and Hispanics are combined (both of which had low arrest rates), there is a slight tendency for blacks to be arrested more often than whites or Hispanics. This difference disappeared in the logistic regression analysis.

#### Speed of Report

The sooner a victim called in a report, the more likely the perpetrator was arrested. When the alleged perpetrators were not arrested, an average of 19 minutes had elapsed before the report was called in. When perpetrators were arrested, the report had almost always been called in at the time of the disturbance ( $t$  for difference of mean length of time to calling=--

2.38,  $df=122$ ,  $p=.02$ ). This finding is similar to those of the Kansas City experiments that indicated faster reports of a crime were more likely to result in arrest. The speed of report remained as a significant factor in one of the two final logistic regression models (see Table 7).

#### Number of Officers

Arrest was more likely as the number of officers responding to the call increased. Arrests occurred with an average of 3 officers present, non-arrest with a mean of 2.1 officers present ( $t=2.27$   $df=13.7$ ,  $p=.01$ ). The difference between two and three officers being present was usually the presence of backup units. Whether the backups were called as a result of departmental policy or anticipation of arrests could not be determined from the data. The relationship of this variable with arrest, however, was non-significant in the logistic regression analysis.

#### Seriousness and Arrest

It was surprising that injury to the victim, repeat offense, involvement of children, or presence of a weapon did not increase the odds of an arrest occurring. All of these factors would tend to indicate a more serious incident.

Possible explanations may reside with the effects of competing variables that continued to be related to arrest even after statistical controls were introduced using logistic regression analysis -- specifically, presence of a 209A order or length of time to reporting the incident. The seriousness of the domestic violence may intimidate the victim(s), resulting in longer delays in reporting. Intimidation may also decrease the likelihood of a victim seeking a 209A order, even though such an order would be more justifiable in those circumstances. However, none of the seriousness variables were associated with presence of a 209A order nor with timeliness of the report, which would tend to imply a complex process by which these variables are related to arrest (if they are related at all).

#### Logistic Model Results

Table 7 summarizes the results of the logistic regression analysis. Two alternative models had a plausible fit between predicted and observed arrest decisions. One model says that arrest is a result of a restraining order effect and the average tendency of officers in a community to arrest perpetrators of domestic violence. The other model says it is primarily a result of the length of time the victim takes to report the offense. Neither model explains a significantly bet-

ter amount of the arrests than the other. The power of the data was not sufficient to decide between these two models.

The two models have different implications for policy. The first model implies that arrest decisions can most be influenced by a joint process of altering arrest policy from discretionary to mandatory and by encouraging the use of 209A orders. The second model implies that arrests can most be influenced by encouraging faster reports of domestic violence and by making officers aware that delays in reporting do not mean the victim isn't serious. Delays in reporting means that intimidation, threats, false promises, and coercion by the perpetrator may have had a more severe impact on the victim. Since the data cannot differentiate between the models, all of these policy options need careful consideration.

#### SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The police responses to domestic violence reported here are similar to that described in other studies. Most are not resolved by arresting the alleged perpetrator. Even in cases that violated the 209A restraining order (a criminal offense) or in which weapons were used, only a minority of cases resulted in arrest. The presence of a 209A violation and witnesses, how-

ever, did increase the rate of arrest.

For too long the issue of domestic violence has been considered a private family affair. The increasing statistics of wife abuse and child abuse are a strong indicator that traditional methods of intervention, such as transporting the injured and advising victims of rights are not adequate. Decisive police and judicial intervention is crucial. Clear signals to offenders and society as a whole are needed to show that violence, whether in the home or on the street, is a criminal matter and will not be tolerated.

#### Further Clarifications of Statutes

A need for clear and comprehensive statutory language is evident. A problem consistently raised with the Abuse Prevention Act has been that the language in the act is contradictory, and confusing. For example, in regard to arrest procedures the language "shall use all reasonable means...to arrest", is taken by some to mean mandatory arrest and others see it as discretionary arrest language. If mandatory arrest language is adopted, however, it needs to be written in such a way that the arrest of victims who defend themselves against violence is not also mandated.

The legal liability of officers under mandatory arrest

statutes also needs consideration. If a given incident is ambiguous as to whether it falls under the domestic violence statute, an officer may be faced with a "false arrest" suit on the one hand and a "failure to adequately protect" suit on the other.

If arrest is not mandated, it is especially important to examine the grounds needed for arrest. Too broad criteria may result in variable and inconsistent policies. Too narrow criteria can result in a failure to protect those in need of it. Since the use of a weapon or presence of a court restraining order have a higher probability of injury to the victim, they are two factors that might be considered as grounds for arrest.

Furthermore, there is a need to expand some existing language regarding probable cause and grounds for arrest, such as to include "assault," rather than "battery" or "attempted battery," as providing probable cause. The significant percentage of children injured in these cases implies a significant risk of child abuse any time that domestic violence occurs and children are present in the household. Knowledge that children were present in the household at the time of the assault should be probable cause to suspect child abuse and allow interviewing them over the objections of the parents or guardians.

The inclusion of "transportation of victims to friends

or relatives homes within reasonable distances" should also be a standard permitted response.

Since the Berk and Sherman and Steinman studies have demonstrated that arrest reduces repetition of the violence (Berk & Sherman, 1988; Steinman, 1988; Sherman & Berk, 1984), there needs to be more action on this. Officers recognize that domestic violence cases are potentially dangerous. They need to act more in response to that recognition. With the present change in law in Massachusetts requiring that domestic assault need not be directly observed to result in arrest, the presence of a 209A violation, weapons, or witnesses should result in more arrests.

#### Resource Issues

Changing statutes to a pro-arrest or a mandatory arrest position can have a significant impact on resources needed by a community. Under pro-arrest or permissive policies, there needs to be programmatic alternatives to incarceration. It is clearly ineffectual to neither arrest nor provide an alternative intervention. In addition, costs are incurred later in the form of mental illness, injury, repeat police calls, and death of some victims. Mandating arrest, however, increases overcrowding in the jails. Whatever action is taken, including non-action,

there will be associated costs and demands on public safety, health, and social service systems. The choice is not whether to spend resources in addressing domestic violence, it is how can those resources be allocated to minimize human trauma and promote public safety. This underscores a need for closer coordination between arrest policy and resource allocation.



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TABLE 1  
TOWNS/CITIES IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE STUDY  
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING 1984

Town/City	Population	Officers		Violent Crime		Property Crime	
		Count	Rate	Count	Rate	Count	Rate
<u>Southeast</u>							
Scituate	17,317	29	1.7	59	3.4	323	18.7
Wareham	18,600	35	1.9	68	3.7	1,090	58.6
<u>Central</u>							
Leominster	34,508	54	1.6	113	3.3	1,186	34.5
<u>East</u>							
Brookline	58,000	140	2.4	227	3.9	2,710	46.7
Burlington	23,002	53	2.3	39	1.7	1,383	60.1
Lawrence	60,327	124	2.1	456	7.6	3,569	59.2
Newburyport	16,000	30	1.9	53	3.3	616	38.5
<u>West</u>							
Agawam	28,000	41	1.5	37	1.3	704	25.1

Rate is per 1,000.

TABLE 2

THE PERCENT OF REQUESTS FOR POLICE ASSISTANCE THAT ARE CLASSIFIED BY POLICE (UPON CLEARANCE) AS THE SAME TYPE OF PROBLEM ORIGINALLY IDENTIFIED BY 911 OPERATORS AMONG HOUSEHOLD LOCATIONS  
 (1) WHICH HAVE AND WHICH HAVE NOT EXPERIENCED A DOMESTIC DISTURBANCE  
 (2) BETWEEN 1977 AND 1982 \*

Problem as Originally Identified by 911 Operators	Percent of Requests Number of Requests	Households with No Disturbances	Households with at Least One Disturbance	Households with One or More Domestic Disturbance within the Previous Year				
				One	Two	Three	Four	Five+
Assault	%	19.0	10.5	6.6	8.0	8.8	7.2	7.9
	N	12,523	16,885	5,675	1,913	920	514	1,153
Robbery	%	48.6	33.3	30.4	19.4	28.6	16.7	15.2
	N	4,377	1,203	273	62	28	18	46
Burglary	%	53.3	34.6	27.1	20.0	19.9	19.1	15.2
	N	50,917	16,821	3,851	1,110	539	278	638
Larceny	%	49.7	28.1	22.8	22.1	17.5	12.5	13.8
	N	15,285	3,851	780	249	114	56	167
Medical Emergency	%	29.5	18.9	16.1	13.5	9.9	12.6	9.3
	N	17,086	12,499	2,372	897	493	261	686
Domestic Disturbance	%	—	59.5	57.8	63.1	63.5	63.6	62.4
	N	—	45,051	21,281	6,687	3,248	1,875	4,829
Number of Household Locations		132,753	35,166	1,128	4,709	1,830	854	1,299

(1) This includes those household locations (i.e. apartments within multiple dwellings) which have generated at least one request for police assistance between 1977 and 1982.

(2) Any household location which generated either a formally or informally classified request for police assistance regarding a domestic disturbance between 1977 and 1982 is included in this group.

\* This table was prepared by Glenn Peirce and Susan Spahr, Center for Applied Social Research, Northern Illinois University.

TABLE 3

PERCENTAGE OF FINAL POLICE CLASSIFICATIONS  
 AMONG REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE ORIGINALLY CLASSIFIED  
 AS CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON \*

Original Classification of request for assistance

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Final Classification	Crime in Progress	Violent Crime	Aggrv. Assault	Fights, Weapons	Domestic Disturbance
Murder	.0	.5	.1	.1	.0
Rape	.0	41.3	.3	.1	.0
Robbery	.6	1.4	4.0	1.1	.1
Aggr. Assault	.5	1.1	13.0	3.5	.8
Simple Assault	.5	2.9	14.3	5.6	1.0
Domestic Dist.	.9	1.9	11.7	8.1	57.8
Disturbance	1.7	2.0	3.9	7.2	5.8
Gangs	10.3	.5	2.7	13.2	1.4
Invest-Service	68.9	42.7	46.2	56.7	30.1
Other	16.6	5.7	3.8	4.4	3.0

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\* This Table was prepared by Glenn Pierce and Susan Spaar, Center for Applied Social Research, Northeastern University, Boston.

TABLE 4  
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VARIABLES

Variables	Percent	N
<u>Repeat Problem</u>		
Yes	31.7	59
No	68.3	127
<u>Offender Sex</u>		
Male	86.3	170
Female	13.7	27
<u>Offender Race</u>		
White	78.4	145
Black	8.1	15
Hispanic	13.5	25
<u>209A in Force</u>		
Yes	7.4	15
No	92.6	188
<u>Children Involved</u>		
Yes	33.2	68
No	66.8	137
<u>Relationship of Offender to Victim</u>		
Husband	33.3	62
Wife	3.2	6
Other Relative	17.7	33
Ex-Spouse	3.2	6
Boyfriend	33.9	63
Girlfriend	2.2	4
Other Person	6.5	12
<u>Living Situation</u>		
Offender Lives with Victim	76.5	88
-Does Not Live with Victim	23.5	27

TABLE 4 (CONT'D)

Variables	Percent	N
<u>Weapon Involved</u>		
Yes	41.1	86
No	58.9	123
<u>Weapon Type</u>		
None	58.4	122
Hands/Feet	28.7	60
Knife	4.3	9
Handgun	1.0	2
Other Objects	6.2	13
<u>Injury to Officer</u>		
None	83.8	119
Minor, Not Visible	6.3	9
Minor, Visible	9.9	14
Serious	0.0	0
Major	0.0	0
<u>Injury to Victim</u>		
None	61.3	98
Minor, Not Visible	13.8	22
Minor, Visible	20.6	33
Serious	3.1	5
Major	1.3	2
<u>Arrest</u>		
Yes	7.5	14
No	92.5	172
<u>Victim Preference</u>		
Arrest	2.7	6
Summons	0.5	1
Protective Custody	2.3	5
Mediation	0.5	1
Transported	3.2	7
Advised Victim of Rights	1.4	3
Referred	0.5	1
Restored Peace	0.5	1
Citizen Refused Help	5.5	12
Nothing Done	0.5	1
Other	9.5	21
No One at Address	0.5	1
Preference not Indicated	70.9	158

TABLE 5  
 HOMICIDES OF CURRENT OR FORMER SPOUSES OR LOVERS,  
 MASSACHUSETTS, 1986 AND 1987\*

RELATIONSHIP OF VICTIM TO OFFENDER	NUMBER OF VICTIMS:	PERCENT OF VICTIMS	SEX OF OFFENDER
<u>Female Victims</u>			
Girlfriend or Ex-girlfriend	17	41.5	M
Wife	15	36.6	M
Girlfriend	1	2.4	F
<u>Subtotal Female Victims</u>	33	80.5	
<u>Male Victims</u>			
Husband	4	9.8	F
Boyfriend	3	7.3	F
Boyfriend	1	2.4	M
<u>Subtotal Male Victims</u>	8	19.5	
TOTAL	41	100.0	

\*Data are from 1986 and 1987 UCR Supplemental Homicide Reports.



TABLE 6  
CORRELATES OF ARREST

Correlate	Arrest		No Arrest		Chi <sup>2</sup>	df	p
	Percent	N	Percent	N			
<u>209A in Force:</u>					4.0	1	.05
Yes	23.1	3	76.9	10			
No	4.9	8	95.1	154			
<u>Presence of Witness:</u>					7.5	1	.01
Yes	18.0	9	82.0	41			
No	3.2	3	96.8	91			
<u>Location of Disturbance:</u>					6.2	2	.04
House/Apt.	6.7	10	93.3	139			
Park/Street	21.1	4	78.9	15			
Bar/Rest- aurant/Other	0.0	0	100.0	15			
<u>Race of Offender:</u>					5.0	1	.03
Black	22.2	2	77.8	7			
Non-Black *	4.6	7	95.4	145			

\* Whites and Hispanics were combined because they had similar arrest rates.

TABLE 7

LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS  
FOR INITIAL AND FINAL MODELS

<u>EFFECT</u>	<u>LOGIT</u>	<u>ODDS RATIO</u>	<u>Z-VALUE</u>
<u>Initial model</u> Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square=5.70, P=.222 Concentration=.25, Entropy=.26			
Arrest versus no arrest	-5.48	.004	-0.004
Restraining order versus no order	0.77	2.157	2.222
Repeat problem versus no repeat problem	0.27	1.31	0.743
Weapon involved versus no weapon involved	0.23	1.25	0.638
Location:			
home-apt. versus other	3.19	24.36	0.002
park-street vs. other	2.77	15.96	0.002
Number of officers initially	1.39	4.00	1.861
Number of officers backup	-0.37	0.69	-0.697
Time to report in minutes	-0.002	0.99	-2.103
<hr/>			
<u>Final Model 1</u> Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square = .00000, P=1.000 Concentration=.048, Entropy=.060			
Arrest versus no arrest	-0.999	0.37	-5.626
Restraining order versus no order	0.450	1.57	2.535
<u>Final Model 2</u> Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square = 2.8859, P=0.089 Concentration=.166, Entropy=.163			
Time to report in minutes	-0.005	0.99	-7.806

APPENDICES

APPENDIX

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- A. Data Collection Instruments
  - 1. Grid sheet call form
  - 2. Domestic Violence Incident Coding Form
- B. State Statutes Relevant to Domestic Violence

DATE:


DEPARTMENT CODE:

GRID SHEET

	2400-	0301-	0601-	1101-	1201-	1301-	1401-	1501-	2101-		2400-	0301-	0601-	1101-	1201-	1301-	1401-	1501-	2101-
	0300	0600	1200	1500	1800	2100	2359				0300	0600	1200	1500	1800	2100	2359		
*01 homicide																			
*02 for rape																			
& att.																			
*03 rob & att																			
*04 agq. ass																			
*05 burg.																			
bce																			
06 larceny																			
07 mv theft																			
*08 non agg																			
ass																			
09 arson																			
omb																			
10																			
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embezz																			
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- 40 CJS ur.
- 41 family
- 42 gather.
- 43
- 44 child/st.
- 45 noise
- 46 phone
- 47 sus'ic.
- 48 boat
- 49
- 50 mo'ed
- 51 snow vio.
- 52 off.want
- 53
- 54 asst citiz
- 55 bld. chk
- 56 mess deliv
- 57 ann. cm lt
- 58 ast mun ac
- 59 rec. trans
- 60 emerg serv
- 61 ambulance
- 62 med/men
- 63 emerg
- 64 suc ceal
- 65 off inj
- 66 incap per

	2400- 0300	0300- 0400	0400- 0900	0900- 1200	1200- 1500	1500- 1800	1800- 2100	2100- 2359
66	fire alarm							
67	burglar alarm							
68	ref.oth.ag							
69	ast.oth ag							
70	mv /traff cmplt							
71	mv n/a							
72	radar							
73	speed							
74	leave scene							
75	acc-per inj							
76	acc-prop dg							
77	traff. cont							
78	aband mv							
79	park cmplt							
80	b&e mv							
81	b&e boat							
82	mal misch							
83	wire down							
84	sales							
85	unwant							
86	acc no mv							
87	road def							
88	ret prop							
89								
90	int dep							
91	serv cruiss							
92	D.M.V							
93	flw up							
94	door open							
98	beat chk							
99	obv heart							
100	obv death							



# DOMESTIC VIOLENCE STUDY

DOMESTIC INCIDENT REPORT \_\_\_\_\_ DEPARTMENT INCIDENT REPORT \_\_\_\_\_

Date Reported / / Date of occurrence / / Time of occurrence : : am pm

Time Reported : : am pm Time Responded : : am pm Time Cleared : : am pm

Address \_\_\_\_\_ Who reported the incident: \_\_\_\_\_

Nature of Dispatch? \_\_\_\_\_ How did you record it? \_\_\_\_\_

Repeat Problem at this address?  Y  N If yes, # of times: \_\_\_\_\_

Location of call :  house/apartment  park/street(public place)  Bar/restaurant  Other(specify): \_\_\_\_\_

PARTIES INVOLVED

	Age	Sex	Race	Relation Code	Injury Code	Arrest Made	What Charge(s)?	Did Victim Live with Offender?
Offender						<input type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N	_____	_____
Victim #1						<input type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N	_____	<input type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N
Victim #2						<input type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N	_____	<input type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N
Victim #3						<input type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N	_____	<input type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N

Race : | Relationship : | Injury Codes :  
W-White H-Hispan 1. Husband 2. Wife 3. Ex-spouse 4. Oth relative 1. Major(Hospitalized) 2. Serious med treatment:  
B-Black A-Asian O-other 5. Boyfriend 6. Girlfriend 7. Other(specify) 13. Minor-apparent 4. Minor-claused 5. None

Were children involved?  Y  N If yes,  transported  relatives/friends contacted  DSS contacted  Other(spec): \_\_\_\_\_

Was 209A in Force?  Y  N  Unknown Bystanders/Witnesses present?  Y  N If yes, # \_\_\_\_\_

Was Physical force/weapon involved?  Y  N If yes:  Long gun  Hand gun  Knife  Blunt object  
 Hands  Feet  Other: \_\_\_\_\_

POLICE INFORMATION

Outcome of call:  arrest  summons  protective custody  mediation  transported  advised victim of rights  referred  
 restored peace  no one at address  nothing done  citizen refused help  other: \_\_\_\_\_

Victim preference for police response: \_\_\_\_\_

Number of Officers initially responding \_\_\_\_\_ Was officer present during incident?  Y  N Number of backup officers: \_\_\_\_\_

Were any officers injured?  Y  N Type of injury: \_\_ (use injury codes above)

Departmental/personal property damaged during incident?  Y  N If yes, describe \_\_\_\_\_

NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION (if needed to fill in details -- continue on back):

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

APPENDIX B

STATE STATUTES RELEVANT TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

STATE	GENERAL PROTECTIVE STATUTES	DIVORCE RELATED STATUTES
AL	Al. Code §§30-5-1 to 30-5-11	
AK	Alaska Stat §§18.65.610, 18.65.520	Alaska Stat. §§9.55.200, 9.55.205
AZ	Az. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13-3601 13-3602	Az. Rev. Stat. Ann. §25-315 Az. Rev. Stat. Ann. 25-324
AR		
CA	Cal. Civ. Code §§4359, 5102, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 527.6	Cal. Civ. Code §§4357, 4359, 4370, 4458, 4516, 4601.5
CO	Colo. Rev. Stat. §§14-4-101 to 14-4-105, 13-6-104 to 105	Co. Rev. Stat. §§14-10-108, 14-10-109
CT	Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §46b-38	Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann §46b-56 45b=83
DL	Del. Code Ann. tit. 10 §§901(9), 902, 921(6), 925(15), 950(5)	Del. Code. Ann. tit. 13 §§1509 1510, titl. 10 §§341, 342
DC	D.C. Code Ann. §§16-1001 to 16-1006 as ammend. 29 D.C. Reg. 3131	D.C. Code Ann. §§16-911
FL	Fla. Stat. Ann. §741.30	Fla. Stat. Ann. §§61.071, 61.08 61.09, 61.13
GA	Ga. Code Ann. §§19-13-1 to 19-13-5	Ga. Code Ann. §§19-6-3, 19-6-10 19-6-14
HI	Hawaii Rev. Stat. §586, §§580-9 to 580-12	
ID		Idaho Code §32-704
IL	Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 40 §§2301-1 to 2301-3, 2302-1 to 2302-13	Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 40 §§501, 602, 607, 608
IN	Ind. S.B. 293,	Ind. Code. Ann. §31-1-11.5-7
IA	Iowa Code Ann. §§236-1 to 236-8	Iowa Code Ann. §598.11
KN	Kan. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. §§60-3101 to 60-3111	Kan. Civ. Proc. Code. Ann. §60-16-7

STATE GENERAL PROTECTIVE STATUTESDIVORCE RELATED STATUTES

KY	Ky. Rev. Stat. §403.710 §§209.010, 209.020 209.040, 209.130	Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§403.160
LA	La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §46:2131 to 46:2139	La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§9:306 to 9:308, LA Code Civ Proc. Ann. art.3604
ME	Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19 §§761-770	Me. Rev. Stat Ann. tit. 19 §214, tit. 19 §§693, 694, 722B
MD	Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §§4-404, 4-501 to 4-506	Md. Cts. and Jud. Proc Code Ann. §§3-602, 3-603, 3-6A-06
MA	Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 209a §§1 to 7, ch. 208 §34C	Mass Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 208 §§17 to 20, 34B, 34C
MI		Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§552.14, 552.15
MN	Minn. Stat. Ann. §518B.01	
MS	Miss. Code Ann. §§93-21-1 to 93-21-29	
MO	Mo. Rev. Stat. §§455.010 to 455.085	Mo. Rev. Stat. §§452.315, 452.380
MT	Mont. Code Ann. §40-4-106	Mont. Code Ann. §§40-4-106
NB	Neb. Rev. Stat §§42-901 to 42-903, 42-924 to 42-926	Neb. Rev. Stat. §§42-357
NV	Nev. Rev. Stat. §33.020	Nev. Rev. Stat. §§125-040 to 125-060, 125-200, 125-220, 125-230
NH	N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§173-B:1 to 173-B:11	N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§458.16
NJ	N.J. Stat. Ann §§2C:25-1 to 2C:25-6	N.J. Stat. Ann. §§2A; 34-23
NM		N.M. Stat. Ann.§§40-4-7
NY	N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §§153-C, 155, 168, 216-a, 262(a)(ii) 812, 813, 817, 818, 821 to 828, 832 to 836, 838, 841 to	N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §§430, 446, 550, 551, 655, 656, 1029, 1056, N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law §§240 (2), 252



STATE GENERAL PROTECTIVE STATUTES                      DIVORCE RELATED STATUTES

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NC	N.C. Gen. Stat. §§50-1 to 50B-7	N.C. Gen. Stat §§50-13.5, 50-16.6
ND	N.D. Cent. Code. §§14-07.1-01 to 14.07.1-08, §§29-01-15(4)	N.D. Cent. Code §§14-05-23
OH	Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§1901.18, 1901.19, 1909.02, §2919.26, §3113.31	
OK	Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22 §60 to 60.6	Okla. Stat Ann. tit. 12 §§1276
OR	Or. Rev. Stat. §§107.700 to 107.720, 133.055, 133.310, 133.381, §33.060	Or. Rev. Stat. §§107.095
PN	35 PA. Const. Stat. Ann. §§10182,10190, 42 PA Cons. Const. Ann. R.C.P. Rules 1901 to 1905	23 PA Cons. Stat. Ann. §§403,502
RI	R.I. Gen. Laws §§15-15-1 to 15-15-6	R.I. Gen. Laws §§15-5-19, 15-5-19.1
SC		S.C. Code Ann. §§20-3-110, 20-7-420
SD	S.D Codified Laws Ann. §§25-10-1 to 25-10-14	S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§25-4-34, 25-4-38, 25-4-40, 25-4-45
TN	Tenn. Code Ann. §§36-1201 to 36-1215	
TX	Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§17.01 to 71.19	Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§3.58, 3.59
UT	Utah Code Ann. §§30-6-1 to 30-6-8	Utah Code Ann. §§30-3-3
VT	Vt. Stat Ann. tit. 15 §§1101 to 1107	Vt. Rules of Civ. Proc. Rule 80, Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13 §§2451
VA		Va. Code §§20-103, §§16.1-279
WA		Wash.. Rev. Code Ann. §26.09.060

STATE GENERAL PROTECTIVE STATUTESDIVORCE RELATED STATUTES

WV W. VA Code §§48-2A-1  
to 48-2A-8, 48-2A-10

W. Va. Code §48-2-13

WS Wis. Stat. Ann. §§767.23,  
813.025 (2)(a), §940.33

Wis. Stat. Ann. §247.23

WY Wyo. Stat. §§35-21-101  
to 35-21-107

Wyo. Stat. §§20-2-106  
(c), 20-2-109 to 20-2-112

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